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Rachel Rebouch6 *
INTRODUCTION
A revolution has happened in prenatal testing. Ushering in
this change is a new prenatal test that relies on a simple blood
sample collected from a pregnant woman.' From the beginning of
pregnancy, cell-free fetal DNA travels across the placental lining
into the mother's bloodstream, increasing in quantity as the
pregnancy progresses.2 Potential parents can test that DNA for
chromosomal abnormalities and for fetal sex after ten weeks of
gestation, which is several weeks before a reliable ultrasound and
seven weeks before an amniocentesis can be performed.' As nu-
merous newspaper and popular media articles report, what wom-
en can discover during their pregnancies will continue to evolve
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dith Harbach, Dave Hoffman, Prabha Kotiswaran, Tom Lin, Laura Little, Greg Mandel,
Muriel Morisey, Danielle Pifiol, Mark Rahdert, Brishen Rogers, Hila Shamir, and Chantal
Thomas for their comments. This article benefited from the remarks of participants at the
Emory Law Workshop on Reproduction and Sexuality, Northeastern Law Workshop on
Sexuality and Reproduction, Emerging Family Law Scholars Workshop, Harvard Institute
on Global Law and Policy, Wisconsin Law Class Crits Conference, Tel Aviv University
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1. See Henry T. Greely, Get Ready for the Flood of Fetal Gene Screening, 469 NATURE
289, 289 (2011).
2. Id. at 290.
3. Stephanie A. Devaney et al., Non-Invasive Fetal Sex Determination Using Cell-
Free Fetal DNA, 306 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 627, 634 (2011) (stating that fetal DNA can be
tested accurately between seven and twelve weeks of gestation while ultrasound is unreli-
able before eleven weeks); 105 AM. JUR. 3D, Proof of Facts § 3 (3d ed. 2009) (indicating that
amniocentesis is performed at about sixteen weeks gestation). In amniocentesis, a long
spinal needle is inserted through the abdomen and the wall of the uterus into the amniotic
sac surrounding the fetus. Id. Another form of prenatal testing is Chorionic Villus Sam-
pling ("CVS"), in which a thin catheter, inserted through the cervix, gathers cells from the
placenta. Id. CVS can occur earlier than amniocentesis, at ten to twelve weeks. Id. How-
ever, CVS has a slightly higher risk of causing miscarriages than amniocentesis. LYNN B.
JORDE ET AL., MEDICAL GENETICS 269 (4th ed. 2010).
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dramatically over the next ten years.4 This new non-invasive pre-
natal test ("NIPT"), coupled with advances in gene sequencing,
could give parents information about all manner of traits, disor-
ders, and propensities-from susceptibility to serious diseases,
such as cancer and heart disease, to superficial traits, such as
hair and eye color.' The test is easy to perform, close to 100% ac-
curate for fetal sex, and currently in clinical and commercial use.
4. See, e.g., Lindsay Abrams, Prenatal Testing: Earlier and More Accurate Than Ev-
er, ATLANTIC (Nov. 5, 2012, 9:30 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/11
/prenatal-testing-earlier-and-more-accurate-than-ever/264472/ 2 /; Erin Biba, This Simple
Blood Test Reveals Birth Defects-And the Future of Pregnancy, WIRED (Dec. 24, 2012,
6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2012/12/ff-prenatal-testing/all/; Carolyn Y. Johnson, DNA
Blood Test Can Detect Prenatal Problems, Bos. GLOBE (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.bos
tonglobe.com/lifestyle/health-wellness/2014/02/26/new-study-suggests-prenatal-genetic-tes
ts-could-offered-all-pregnant-women/V1GQuRL4jkrlM60elXcQCK/story.html; Jonathan
Lapook, New DNA Test Could Revolutionize Prenatal Screening, CBS NEWS (Feb. 26,
2014, 7:20 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/new-dna-test-could-revolutionize-pre-natal-
screening/; Marilynn Marchione, The Big Story: DNA Blood Tests Show Prenatal Screen-
ing Promise, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 26, 2014, 6:07 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/
dna-blood-tests-show-prenatal-screening-promise; Steven Salzberg, A DNA Sequencing
Breakthrough That Many Expectant Moms Will Want, FORBES (Mar. 9, 2014, 8:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevensalzberg/2014/03/09/a-dna-sequencing-breathrough-th
at-many-expectant-moms-will-want/; Michael Specter, The Gene Factory, NEW YORKER
Jan. 6, 2014, at 34, 40, available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/01/06/the-
gene-factory; Rob Stein, Blood Test Provides More Accurate Prenatal Testing for Down
Syndrome, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 26, 2014, 5:01 PM), http://www.npr.orgblogs/health
/2014/02/26/282095202/blood-test-provides-more-accurate-prenatal-testing-for-down-syndr
ome; Christopher Weaver, Tough Calls on Prenatal Tests: Companies Race to Promote
New Genetic Screen for Down Syndrome; Worries About Patient Confusion, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 4, 2013, at Bi, available at http://online.wsj.comInews/articles/SB1000142412788732
4883604578398791568615644.
5. See Bernard M. Dickens, Ethical and Legal Aspects of Non-Invasive Prenatal Ge-
netic Diagnosis, 124 INT'L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 181, 181-82 (2014) ("What was
once a cavernous divide between the outer reaches of imaginative science fiction and the
reality of the limited capacity of prevailing biotechnology is becoming progressively nar-
rowed, making it foreseeable to achieve complete gene sequencing of an early fetus in
utero by resort to cffDNA testing."); Jaime S. King, And Genetic Testing for All ... The
Coming Revolution in Non-Invasive Prenatal Genetic Testing, 42 RUTGERS L.J. 599, 599-
600, 656 (2011) (noting that non-invasive prenatal tests relying on cffDNA can detect
Down syndrome, trisomy 13, fetal sex, and other genetic characteristics); John A. Robert-
son, Abortion and Technology: Sonograms, Fetal Pain, Viability, and Early Prenatal Diag-
nosis, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 327, 370-73 (2011) [hereinafter Robertson, Abortion and
Technology].
6. Ashwin Agarwal et al., Commercial Landscape of Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing
in the United States, 33 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 521, 521-23 (2013) ("Several applications of
NIPT. . . are already in use, and testing for common chromosomal aneuploidies such as
trisomies 13, 18, and 21 became commercially available in 2011."); Antina de Jong et al.,
Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing: Ethical Issues Explored, 18 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 272,
272 (2010) (noting that testing can be easy and safe); Abrams, supra note 4 (noting that
the test can be completed with 99.92% accuracy).
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NIPT is largely unregulated, and patients, physicians, and in-
surance companies manage prenatal testing.' However, the first
legislation to respond explicitly to NIPT focuses on restricting
abortion.' State legislatures have entered the regulatory field
with statutes prohibiting pregnancy terminations based on fetal
sex or fetal diagnosis. Before 2011, only two states prohibited sex-
selective abortion.' Six states have since passed sex-selective
abortion bans"o and almost half of the country's state legislatures
have considered similar bills. North Dakota recently enacted a
law prohibiting abortion based on a diagnosis of "genetic abnor-
mality or a potential for a genetic abnormality.""
The Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act ("PRENDA"), introduced
three times in the U.S. Congress, is the federal counterpart of
state bans." PRENDA refers to an emerging market of non-
invasive prenatal genetic testing, warning about a new "sex-
determination niche industry" of "low-cost commercial prod-
ucts."" PRENDA would impose fines and jail time on a physician
who "performs [or attempts to perform] an abortion knowing that
such abortion is sought based on the sex, gender, color or race of
the child, or the race of a parent of that child."" The current ver-
7. See Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproduc-
tive Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1457 (2008).
8. Cf. Prenatally & Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act, Pub. L. No.
110-374, § 3, 122 Stat. 4051-52 (2008) (enabling the Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices to issue grants to organizations that collect information on genetic disorders and as-
sist families raising children with Down syndrome or other prenatally or postnatally diag-
nosed conditions). But see Deborah Pergament, What Does Choice Really Mean?: Prenatal
Testing, Disability, and Special Education Without Illusions, 23 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L. &
MED. 55, 80-83 (2013).
9. See e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 510/6 (8) (2012); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3201(c) (1989).
10. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02 (2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-731.2.B (2012);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10 (2014) (effective July 1, 2014); H.R. 2253, 85th Leg. Reg.
Sess. (Kan. 2013); H.B. 1305, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013); S.B. 353, Gen. As-
semb., 2013 Sess. (N.C. 2013).
11. For a discussion of proposed state laws, see infra Part II.A.
12. H.B. 1305, § 2(1)(b), 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013).
13. Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA) of 2013, H.R. 447, 113th Cong. (2013)
[hereinafter PRENDA]; Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA) of 2012, H.R. 3541,
112th Cong. (2012); Susan B. Anthony and Frederick Douglass Prenatal Nondiscrimina-
tion Act of 2009, H.R. 1822, 111th Cong. (2009).
14. PRENDA § 2(a)(1)(C).
15. PRENDA § 250(a); cf. infra text accompanying notes 151-52 (problematizing
PRENDA's treatment of race). This article's focus on sex selection does not intend to min-
imize the problematic treatment of race by PRENDA or other state bills. The race provi-
sions of PRENDA suggest troubling stereotypes and are difficult to understand. PRENDA
devotes only two pages of the twenty-five page bill to race-based terminations. It is un-
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sion of PRENDA did not move out of the House Subcommittee on
the Constitution and Civil Justice" or the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary." But even if PRENDA does not pass next year or
in the foreseeable future, the bill lends legitimacy to state legisla-
tive efforts and offers an example of laws seeking to regulate
abortion decisions after testing.
Bills such as PRENDA draw on longstanding advocacy by
women's rights groups on sex selection, although PRENDA co-
opts that advocacy for anti-abortion ends. In the 1980s and 1990s,
U.S. scholars and advocates denounced the skewed sex ratios of
other countries that suggested some combination of sex-selective
abortion, female infanticide, and neglect of girls." International
clear how a provider would determine that abortion is "because the child or a parent of the
child is of an undesired race" or "motivated by race bias." PRENDA § 2(c). PRENDA states
that "[albortion is the leading cause of death in the Black community," which suggests
that all African American women having terminations have sought race-based abortions
under the bill. Id. §§ 2(d), (e). The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") challenged,
unsuccessfully, the constitutionality of Arizona's law banning race-based abortions, argu-
ing that the law permits discrimination and invidious stereotypes. See Jessica Mason
Pieklo, Advocates Ask Ninth Circuit to Reinstate Challenge to Arizona Race- and Sex-
Selection Abortion Ban, RH REALITY CHECK (Mar. 13, 2014, 9:56 AM), http://rhreality
check.org/article/2014/03/13/advocates-ask-ninth-circuit-reinstate-challenge-arizona-race
sex-selection-abortion-ban/.
16. See PRENDA, H.R. 447, 113th Cong. (2013) (as reported by House Judiciary).
17. See PRENDA, S.B. 138, 113th Cong. (2013) (as reported by Senate Judiciary).
18. Eg., April L. Cherry, A Feminist Understanding of Sex-Selective Abortion: Solely a
Matter of Choice?, 10 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 161, 168-70, 172 (1995) (stating that "the short-
age of girl children is as severe in Western 'developed' nations as it is in the 'developing'
world"); Jodi Danis, Sexism and "The Superfluous Female": Arguments for Regulating Pre-
Implantation Sex Selection, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 219, 223-25, 240-41 (1995) (question-
ing whether "persons in the United States should be permitted to treat X-sperm cells as a
negative trait to be selected against"); Lynne Marie Kohm, Sex Selection Abortion and the
Boomerang Effect of a Woman's Right to Choose: A Paradox of the Skeptics, 4 WM. & MARY
J. WOMEN & L. 91, 93, 109-10 (1997) (commenting that most ethicists "in the United
States have assumed that such abortions are undesirable, if not immoral") (internal cita-
tion omitted); Rachel E. Remaley, 'The Original Sexist Sin": Regulating Preconception Sex
Selection Technology, 10 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L. & MED. 249, 277-78 (2000) (noting the dif-
ference between dominant preference for males versus females is greater in India and
Asian countries than in the United States); John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Off-
spring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L. REV. 421, 457-58 (1996) [hereinafter Robertson, Genetic
Selection] (explaining how the ratio of males to females in China increased during the one-
child per family policy); Dorothy C. Wertz & John C. Fletcher, Ethical and Social Issues in
Prenatal Sex Selection: A Survey of Geneticists in 37 Nations, 46 Soc. SCl. MED. 255, 255,
270 (1998) [hereinafter Wertz & Fletcher, Ethical and Social Issues] ("The basic reason
why geneticists in many Western nations can compromise their personal views in favor of
client autonomy is that they do not regard sex selection as a social problem."); Dorothy C.
Wertz & John C. Fletcher, Fatal Knowledge? Prenatal Diagnosis and Sex Selection, 19
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 21, 25 (1989) [hereinafter Wertz & Fletcher, Fatal Knowledge?] (de-
scribing sex selection in India).
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human rights law now recognizes sex selection as gender discrim-
ination, violence against women, or both." As discrimination, it is
the product of gender inequality in law and in cultural practices.20
As violence against women, it is a type of subjugation that alleg-
edly results in trafficking, increased militancy, and rampant vio-
lence when men outnumber women." The claim that sex selection
will lead to widespread violence pervades so many different liter-
atures that it has become common sense, even though it is a
claim that is difficult to prove.
PRENDA calls for gender equality and protection from violence
with the moral claims of the anti-abortion movement. But both
opponents and proponents of current legislation face significant
obstacles. On the one hand, PRENDA is a poor tool for its pur-
ported goal: reason-based abortion bans are difficult to enforce
because patients have not been required to give reasons for their
terminations and typically are not subject to state mechanisms
that vet truthfulness.23 On the other hand, reproductive rights
supporters face a stark dilemma of how to best advocate for curb-
ing sex selection without supporting abortion restrictions, espe-
cially given the rhetoric of violence that characterizes the prac-
tice.
Confronted by their prior advocacy against the practice, oppo-
nents of PRENDA offer constitutional and empirical rebuttals,
neither of which is terribly persuasive. First, legal commentators
19. See infra Part III.A.1-2.
20. See infra Part III.A.1.
21. See infra Part III.A.2.
22. See id. Note that this article references "sex" rather than "gender" in describing
sex-selection practices. In so doing, it refers to a commonly understood description of bio-
logical differences between male and female infants at birth. This article does not intend
to suggest that gender, sexuality, and sexual difference are neutral, non-constructed, or
interchangeable terms. Quite to the contrary, one problem of the current sex-selective
abortion debate is that it takes for granted a binary between women and men, leaving
scant room for the much more complicated and nuanced understanding of gender, sex, and
sexuality developed over the last several decades. See Judith Butler, Performative Acts
and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory, 40 THEATRE
J. 519, 520 (1988) ("In distinguishing sex from gender, feminist theorists have disputed
causal explanations that assume that sex dictates or necessitates certain social meanings
for women's experience."). See generally JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER 176-203
(2004) (complicating the definitions of and commitments to sexuality, gender, and sexual
difference).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 172-78.
5232015]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
that oppose PRENDA argue that the bill is unconstitutional."
They read Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
25Casey as conferring constitutional protection for abortion before
viability for any reason.26 However, the Supreme Court of the
United States' more recent decision in Gonzales v. Carhart, which
upheld a law that banned an abortion procedure performed infre-
quently before viability, complicates the question of whether a
pre-viability abortion ban is always impermissible.27 Gonzales al-
so strengthened the interests that states can assert in protecting
the integrity of physicians, potential life, and the mental health
of women.28 Anticipating constitutional challenges, PRENDA's
drafters crafted language that aligns with the state interests set
out in Gonzales." PRENDA implies that low-cost, non-invasive
testing will lead to "neo-eugenics"" and unfettered control over a
potential child's nonmedical genetic characteristics; pressure on
women to have abortions they will regret; and incentives for pro-
viders to offer NIPT for financial gain." Under Gonzales, these
claims may be cognizable as state interests that could justify laws
banning sex-selective abortion or, for that matter, abortions for
reason of genetic abnormalities.
Second, PRENDA opponents argue that sex selection (specifi-
cally son preference) does not happen in the United States or only
happens in rare circumstances.2 There is no conclusive proof that
sex selection takes place on a broad scale in this country,2 but re-
24. See, e.g., Jaime Staples King, Not This Child: Constitutional Questions in Regulat-
ing Non-Invasive Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis and Selective Abortion, 60 UCLA L. REV. 2, 8
(2012) [hereinafter King, Not This Child] (debating the constitutional question of a state
banning abortion because of the reason for abortion).
25. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 264-68.
27. 550 U.S. 124, 146-47, 168 (2007).
28. See Sonia M. Suter, The "Repugnance" Lens of Gonzales v. Carhart and Other
Theories of Reproductive Rights: Evaluating Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 76 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1514, 1519 (2008).
29. Compare PRENDA, H.R. 447, 113th Cong. (2013), with Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 158-
60.
30. PRENDA § 2(a)(1)(K). See generally Sonia M. Suter, A Brave New World of De-
signer Babies?, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897, 937 (2007) (describing neo-eugenics as "an
attempt to influence reproduction to have healthier, fitter offspring").
31. PRENDA § 2, at 10-13; see infra Part III.B for a discussion on the constitutionali-
ty of a sex-selective abortion ban.
32. See infra Part III.B.2.
33. Data from the National Center for Health Statistics reveals normal sex ratios of
babies born in the United States from 1975 to 2002. See T.J. Mathews & Brady E. Hamil-
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cent studies suggest that sex-selective abortion, in which boys are
preferred to girls, happens in certain communities." Moreover,
potential parents select for fetal sex with assisted reproductive
technologies ("ART"). Physicians report that some patients use a
pre-implantation genetic diagnosis for sex even when they have
no fertility problems."
The intent of this article is not to make empirical claims about
the frequency of sex selection or normative claims about what
courts should do if confronted with a constitutional challenge. Its
purpose is to demonstrate that the abortion politics dominating
this discussion cannot address the practical problems that will
arise with the introduction of NIPT. Discussions of sex-selective
abortion bans do not simply need firmer constitutional or empiri-
cal grounding; they require a better understanding of what poli-
cies shape prenatal testing.
Understanding testing helps elucidate why legislative battles
on sex selection may succeed and fail with little practical effect.
Evolving standards for genetic counseling and informed consent,
however, will shape how patients make decisions after receiving
prenatal test results. Historically, negotiating what to test and
what to do after testing has been a matter of ethics and not nec-
essarily of law." Those who oppose bills like PRENDA might use
their advocacy energies both to resist the anti-abortion tactics of
ton, Trend Analysis of the Sex Ratio at Birth in the United States, 53 NAT'L VITAL STAT.
REP. at 1, 1-6 (2005).
34. See, e.g., James F.X. Egan et al., Distortions of Sex Ratios at Birth in the United
States: Evidence for Prenatal Gender Selection, 31 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 560, 560-65
(2011).
35. See, e.g., Gina Kolata, Ethics Questions Arise as Genetic Testing of Embryos In-
creases, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/04/health/
ethics -questions-arise-as-genetic-testing-of-embryos-increases.html?hp&_r= (discussing
the ethics of choosing sex through in vitro fertilization). Research shows that IVF users
select female embryos just as frequently as male ones due to the desire to maintain a bal-
anced household (in terms of children's gender). Sujatha Jesudason & Susannah Baruch,
Sex Selection: What Role for Providers, 86 CONTRACEPTION 597, 597 (2012).
36. See Jesudason & Baruch, supra note 35, at 597 (noting that there are many rea-
sons why people choose to engage in sex selection and there is a lack of data revealing
why).
37. See ALEXANDRA MINNA STERN, TELLING GENES: THE STORY OF GENETIC
COUNSELING IN AMERICA 147, 164-69 (2012) (describing, with the introduction of amnio-
centesis, the debate among bioethicists about whether sex selection should be allowed in
every instance, as a matter of patient choice, or whether providers should dissuade pa-
tients from sex selection).
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state legislators, and to grapple with the management of NIPT in
physicians' offices and on the market.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I reviews the literature
on NIPT and the prevalence of sex selection. Part II describes
current legislative strategies to ban sex selection, mapping the
commonalities among pending bills and recently enacted legisla-
tion. Focusing on PRENDA as an example, Part II also describes
how the federal bill depicts the social problems of gender discrim-
ination and violence against women. Part III demonstrates how
the drafters of bills banning sex-selective abortion have relied on
the rhetoric of the women's rights movement. Additionally, it ex-
plains why empirical and constitutional claims fail to respond to
that co-optation. Part IV considers the costs and opportunities of
shifting from explicating constitutional rights and contesting em-
pirical studies to discussing regulatory options for new testing
technology.
I. TESTING SEX AND SEX SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES
In 1955, scientists discovered that fetal cells collected from
amniotic fluid in the second trimester could predict a fetus' sex."
Today, fetal cells collected from the maternal bloodstream can re-
veal sex without amniocentesis, and it can be done as early as the
first trimester."
There is evidence that Americans engage in sex-selective abor-
tion.40 Sometimes they do so to balance the boy-girl ratio of their
families41 or because they prefer a specific gender.42 This part re-
38. Cynthia M. Powell, The Current State of Prenatal Genetic Testing in the United
States, in PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY RIGHTS 44 (Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch
eds., 2000) (recounting that in 1955 amniocentesis was performed to identify risks of sex-
linked disorders); STERN, supra note 37, at 153 (noting that amniocentesis was originally
performed later in the second trimester).
39. Powell, supra note 38, at 50; Caroline F. Wright & Hilary Burton, The Use of Cell-
Free Fetal Nucleic Acids in Maternal Blood for Non-Invasive Prenatal Diagnosis, 15 HUM.
REPROD. UPDATE 139, 140-43 (2008).
40. See Egan et al., supra note 34, at 565.
41. Audrey R. Chapman & Peter A. Benn, Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing for Early
Sex Identification: A Few Benefits and Many Concerns, 56 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 530,
531 (2013) ("Some families are likely to seek the information about sex out of curiosity or
to prepare for the birth of their child. . . . [, or] for purposes of family balancing . . , or be-
cause of strong preferences for one sex.").
42. See Egan et al., supra note 34, at 565.
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views the emerging technology that permits sex determination
early in pregnancy, summarizes demographic and ethnographic
studies that explore whether sex selection actually occurs, and
describes how pre-implantation genetic diagnosis ("PGD") facili-
tates sex selection.
A. New Prenatal Genetic Tests
Until the development of NIPT,4 3 prospective parents who
wanted to learn the sex of a fetus had three options: chorionic vil-
lus sampling ("CVS"), amniocentesis, and ultrasound." CVS and
amniocentesis both rely on a sample extracted in utero, whereas
41NIPT depends only on a blood sample from a pregnant woman.
Amniocentesis and CVS are typically not used until early in the
second trimester; both tests are invasive, expensive, and carry up
to a 1% risk of miscarriage. 46 Almost all pregnant women who
seek to determine fetal sex rely on ultrasound." Unlike amnio-
centesis, ultrasound is non-invasive, free from risks of miscar-
riage, and cost effective; but like amniocentesis, an ultrasound for
sex is not reliable until the second trimester of pregnancy.4
43. Amy Swanson et al., Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing: Technologies, Clinical Assays
and Implementation Strategies for Women's Healthcare Practitioners, 1 CURRENT GENETIC
MED. REP. 113, 114 (2013) (noting "many exciting advances in the field of non-invasive
prenatal testing (NIPT) including the discovery of fetal cell-free DNA (cfDNA) in maternal
plasma and the development of massively parallel sequencing (MPS) and counting tech-
niques using cfDNA, leading to the launch of the first non-invasive tests"). Cell-free DNA
travels across the placental lining and comprises three to six percent of the total cell-free
DNA in maternal circulation. After birth, almost all fetal DNA leaves the mother's blood-
stream, although a very small quantity of fetal DNA can linger for years. Wright & Bur-
ton, supra note 39, at 140. The NIPT sex-determination test was designed primarily to
identify and treat sex-linked diseases, such as hemophilia or Duchene's muscular dystro-
phy. See Peter A. Benn & Audrey R. Chapman, Ethical Challenges in Providing Non-
Invasive Prenatal Diagnosis, 22 CURRENT OP. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 128, 128-29
(2010) (describing how NIPT has been developed in response to difficulties arising from
traditional invasive prenatal testing, giving parents a test for sex-linked disorders without
as much risk).
44. Peter G. Scheffer et al., Reliability of Fetal Sex Determination Using Maternal
Plasma, 115 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 117, 117 (2010).
45. Wright & Burton, supra note 39, at 139-40.
46. See Chapman & Benn, supra note 41, at 532-33; Wright & Burton, supra note 39,
at 139.
47. Chapman & Benn, supra note 41, at 532.
48. See Devaney et al., supra note 3, at 627-28, 634 (stating that the "[aidvantages of
ultrasound examination are that it is noninvasive, widely available, and accurate after
approximately 13 weeks' gestation.").
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The accuracy of NIPT increases as pregnancy progresses,49 and
NIPT is reliable after seven to twelve weeks of gestation.o In
2011, the Journal of the American Medical Association published
a meta-analysis of fifty-seven published studies on NIPT for sex
determination. The results show high levels of accuracy between
seven and twelve weeks at just under 99% specificity (probability
of a negative result) and 95% sensitivity (probability of a positive
result).52 This means that NIPT could become part of a patient's
first prenatal visit, which occurs between eight and twelve weeks
into the pregnancy." NIPT could also take the place of risk
screening currently in use-ultrasounds and serum screenings
that reveal information about the pregnancy.54 At the point of
amniocentesis or CVS, most patients have assessed the risks of
certain genetic and physical conditions with two ultrasounds, at
around ten and twenty weeks, and two serum screenings (blood
tests), at around twelve and sixteen weeks." NIPT can supple-
ment or eliminate these prenatal screenings as well as potentially
displace amniocentesis or CVS." This last point has been a source
of some controversy. Research studies have urged caution regard-
ing the clinical use of NIPT for aneuploidies (or disorders of miss-
ing or extra chromosomes), especially as a substitution from tra-
ditional screening and testing." Researchers in maternal-fetal
medicine have questioned whether rates of sensitivity and speci-
ficity are relevant for the broader population of women, who have
49. Id. (explaining the attributing factors to improved performance of the test in later
gestation).
50. Id. at 634; see also M. Hill et al., Non-Invasive Prenatal Determination of Fetal
Sex: Translating Research into Clinical Practice, 80 CLINICAL GENETICS 68, 72 (2011).
51. Devaney et al., supra note 3, at 627.
52. Id. at 627-28, 631, 633; Mary E. Norton et al., Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing for
Fetal Aneuploidy: Clinical Assessment and a Plea for Restraint, 121 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 847, 850 (2013).
53. See Ruth M. Farrell et al., Risk and Uncertainty: Shifting Decision Making for An-
euploidy Screening to the First Trimester of Pregnancy, 13 GENETICS MED. 429, 434 (2011).
54. De Jong et al., supra note 6, at 273.
55. See Stephanie Morian et al., A New Era in Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing, 369
NEw ENG. J. MED. 499, 499 (2013) (describing ultrasound technology as occurring around
week eleven, blood samples taken around week ten, and amniocentesis as occurring after
week fifteen). But see de Jong et al., supra note 6, at 273 (describing ultrasound as occur-
ring around week eighteen, CVS as occurring around week eleven, and amniocentesis as
occurring around week fifteen).
56. De Jong et al., supra note 6, at 273.
57. Morian et al., supra note 55, at 499 (listing some of the issues with NIPT testing,
such as lack of Food and Drug Administration regulation and the limited evidence con-
cerning performance characteristics).
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low-risk pregnancies, given that the first studies of NIPT's accu-
racy relied on populations with known aneuploidies." However,
these concerns are abating. Research published in February 2014
suggests NIPT is an accurate and appropriate screening tool for
all pregnant women."
There is an emerging and lucrative market for NIPT." For-
profit companies, such as Verinata Health, Sequenom, and Ariosa
Diagnostics, sell NIPT to health care providers and health care
organizations." At present, these companies offer NIPT through
physicians and advertise NIPT as ' screening tests' that may re-
quire follow-up procedures."6 2 Tests that are available on the
market to physicians, and soon directly to consumers, are mar-
keted presently to women over the age of thirty-five, an age group
with higher risk of pregnancies with a genetic disorder.64 Al
58. See Norton et al., supra note 52, at 849 ("The tests have primarily been validated
on archived samples in carefully selected groups of high-risk women; such studies do not
answer the question of clinical use in the general population."); see also Morian et al., su-
pra note 55, at 499 (stating that studies on NIPT rely on "archived samples with known
karyotypes that intentionally included a large proportion of specimens from women with
known aneuploid fetuses").
59. See Diana W. Bianchi et al., DNA Sequencing Versus Standard Prenatal Aneu-
ploidy Screening, 370 NEw ENG. J. MED. 799, 806 (2014) ("[A] comparison showed that
noninvasive prenatal cfDNA testing performed better than standard screening methods,
with an improvement by a factor of 10 in the positive predictive value for trisomy 21 in our
predominantly low-risk patient population.").
60. See Norton et al., supra note 52, at 847-48 (noting that NIPT, unlike amniocen-
tesis and CVS, was moved out of an academic setting and licensed to commercial compa-
nies who were largely funded by venture capital, allowing these tests to "bypass some
components of a rigorous, unbiased vetting process, which helps to provide quality assur-
ance").
61. Jaime S. King, Politics and Fetal Diagnostics Collide, 491 NATURE, Nov. 2012, at
33, 34.
62. Id.
63. The direct-to-consumer market will also evolve in the next decade. See Diana W.
Bianchi, At-Home Fetal DNA Gender Testing: Caveat Emptor, 107 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 216, 217 (2006). But currently, companies have been somewhat cautious in
advertising testing kits and have not released data on the numbers of prenatal tests sold.
See Sunita Puri & Robert D. Nachtigall, The Ethics of Sex Selection: A Comparison of the
Attitudes and Experiences of Primary Care Physicians and Physician Providers of Clinical
Sex Selection Services, 93 FERTILITY & STERILITY 2107, 2107 (2010); cf. Gail H. Javitt,
Pink or Blue? The Need for Regulation Is Black and White, 86 FERTILITY & STERILITY 13,
14 (2006) ("State laws vary with respect to whether tests can be offered directly to con-
sumers, and many states allow it. Moreover, even those tests that are currently physician
mediated for the most part lack formal assurance from any of the traditional regulators
that they. . . provide information useful to health-care decision making.").
64. See, e.g., Expectant Parents: Overview, VERIFI PRENATAL TEST, http://www.veri
fitest.comlexpectant-parents/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2014). Verinata encourages women to
test at ten weeks, rather than seven weeks, to ensure the accuracy of results. Compare id.
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though researchers have warned that companies selling NIPT
products have ignored the present recommendations of profes-
sional organizations, the trajectory of NIPT, particularly for sex,
in clinics and on the internet appears clear." As one obstetrician
put it, "I wouldn't be surprised if in a few years there are pink
and blue kits available at supermarkets where you buy them.""
Moreover, private health care insurers (for example, UnitedH-
ealth Group, WellPoint, and Aetna) cover NIPT for pregnant
women with family histories of genetic conditions who are over
thirty-five years old, or who screen positive for moderate- to high-
risk of fetal abnormalities." The present limitations on which
women should use NIPT will likely change as research emerges
on the accuracy of NIPT for women of any age, medical history, or
level of risk. And the costs of NIPT will decrease as it becomes
routine and sequencing technology advances." Tests that are not
covered by insurance now cost between $1200 and $2800; with
insurance, tests cost between $200 and $235." Laboratories offer-
ing NIPT will soon sign test-specific contracts with insurance
plans, making their particular test "in-network and covered," re-
sulting in lower out-of-pocket costs for patients." Additionally,
companies, such as Verinata and Sequenom, offer customers
without insurance coverage caps on out-of-pocket costs and intro-
ductory pricing deals."
("This screening test may be an option for you to consider if: You have a confirmed single-
ton or twin pregnancy of at least 10 weeks gestational age . . ."), with Devaney et al., supra
note 3, at 634 ("In summary, the overall performance of noninvasive fetal sex determina-
tion using maternal blood can be high, if performed . .. when sufficient cell-free fetal DNA
is present (7 weeks' gestation or later).").
65. Norton et al., supra note 52, at 849 (noting that the age cutoff for pregnancy is
discredited by many as an effective screening test). The American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists ("ACOG") advises that providers should only offer NIPT to women with
serum and ultrasound screenings that indicate high risk of fetal genetic conditions, or
family histories of genetic disease. AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS
COMM. ON GENETICS, COMM. Op. No. 545: NON-INVASIVE PRENATAL TESTING FOR FETAL
ANEUPLOIDY 2 (2012); see also Morain et al., supra note 55, at 501. But see Bianchi et al.,
supra note 59, at 799, 805 (describing research that supports NIPT for women at a low
risk of carrying fetuses with genetic abnormalities).
66. Puri & Nachtigall, supra note 63, at 2111.
67. Weaver, supra note 4.
68. See Greely, supra note 1, at 290.
69. Agarwal et al., supra note 6, at 522.
70. Swanson et al., supra note 43, at 117.
71. See Morian et al., supra note 55, at 501; Rita Rubin, New Prenatal Blood Tests
Come with High Hopes and Some Questions, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Nov. 26, 2012),
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In short, NIPT is easy to use, becoming less expensive, and in-
creasingly supported by a growing market. NIPT can give pro-
spective parents information about a fetus' genetic profile much
earlier in pregnancy.7 2 Indeed, the fear that NIPT will sweep into
the country's obstetric offices has been one justification to legis-
late. Before assessing that legislation, the next two sections con-
sider the inclination to utilize this new technology to test for fetal
sex.
B. Questions of Prevalence
To what extent sex selection occurs in the United States has
been a matter of fierce debate over the last few years." In 2012,
an anti-abortion group, Live Action, sent members "undercover"
to five Planned Parenthood clinics under the guise of pregnant
women seeking abortions because the fetus was female.74 In a
video posted online, a Planned Parenthood staff member ex-
plained at what point in pregnancy a patient may learn the sex of
a fetus and that Planned Parenthood would not deny her an abor-
tion based on her reason. 5 The staff member concluded the con-
versation by wishing the patient, "Good luck, and I hope you do
get your boy."" Three days after this interaction, Planned
http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/prenatal-blood-tests/ (discussing the pricing for the tests
performed by Verinata and Sequenom and indicating that the Verinata test offers an "in-
troductory price").
72. See Wright & Burton, supra note 39, at 139-40; cf. Greer Donley et al., Prenatal
Whole Genome Sequencing: Just Because We Can, Should We?, 42 HASTINGS CTR. REP.,
July-Aug. 2012, at 28, 33.
73. See Sujatha Jesudason & Anat Shenker-Osorio, Sex Selection in America: Why It
Persists and How We Can Change It, ATLANTIC (May 31, 2012, 8:30 AM), www.theatlantic.
com/politics/archive/2012/05/sex-selection-in-america-why-it-persists-and-how-we-can-cha
nge-it/257864/ ("Son preference, missing girls, sex selection: We may seek to label these
Chinese or Indian issues, but they exist here in America . . . . the purportedly spreading
practice of sex-selective abortion is back in the news."); Osagie K. Obasogie, Are Skewed
Sex Ratios in America's Future?, BIOPOL. TIMES (June 30, 2011), www.biopoliticaltimes.
orglarticle.php?id=5775.
74. Laura Bassett, Planned Parenthood Sting Caught on Video, Released by Anti-
Abortion Activists, HUFFINGTON POST (May 29, 2012, 7:28 PM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2012/05/29/planned-parenthood-video_n_1552672.html; see also Leslie Kantor &
Carolyn Westhoff, New Secret Hoax Campaign Another Tactic in the Wars Over Safe Abor-
tion Care and Women's Rights, RH REALITY CHECK (Apr. 23, 2012, 3:09 PM), http:/rhreal
itycheck.org/article/2012/04/23/secret-hoax-campaign-is-another-abortion-wars-tactic/.
75. Bassett, supra note 74.
76. Id.
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Parenthood Federation of America ("PPFA") fired the employee
and pledged to train other employees on proper protocol.7
Though the "sting operation" was intended to incite controver-
sy with a purposely anti-abortion message, it tells little about the
actual prevalence of sex selection in the United States. Live Ac-
tion's activities, however, follow from a number of demographic
studies that suggest that sex selection has been, for some com-
munities, a U.S. phenomenon. Included in the Congressional
Record of PRENDA," studies published in Applied Economics and
Prenatal Diagnosis offer evidence that gender selection occurs in
Chinese, Korean, Filipino, and Indian families." These studies re-
lied on birth records to show higher ratios of male births to fe-
male births in comparison to other ethnic groups." Moreover, if
the first two children were daughters, the third child was more
likely to be a son, and women were more likely to have terminat-
ed a pregnancy between the second and third child." Likewise, a
2008 study, published in the Proceedings of the National Academy
of Science, reports skewed sex ratios among children born to for-
eign-born Chinese, Indian, or Korean parents in the U.S. census
data." The study similarly found that, while the sex ratio for
77. Id. It is unclear what the "proper protocol" is, given that Texas, where the "sting
operation" occurred, does not ban sex-selective abortion and PPFA does not typically deny
women abortions based on the reason stated. PPFA's news release stated: "It is critical
that we help the public understand the importance of providing nonjudgmental, confiden-
tial care even when faced with difficult questions about deeply troubling issues such as
sex selection motivated by gender bias." Press Release, Planned Parenthood Federation of
America (May 30, 2012) (on file with author).
78. Susan B. Anthony and Frederick Douglass Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act of
2011: Hearing on H.R. 3541 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 97-143, 156-61 (2011).
79. Jason Abrevaya, Are There Missing Girls in the United States? Evidence from
Birth Data, 1 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON., no. 2, 2009, at 1, 7, 15, 25-26 (concluding that
Chinese and Indian parents were more likely to have a son at their third and fourth births
than the other ethnic groups that were studied based on data from the 1980, 1990, and
2000 United States Censuses, data from the National Center for Health Statistics from
1971 to 2004, and data from the California Department of Health Services from 1970 to
2005); see also Egan et al., supra note 34, at 564-65.
80. See Abrevaya, supra note 79, at 13; Egan et al., supra note 34, at 564.
81. Abrevaya, supra note 79, at 26-28; Egan et al., supra note 34, at 564. Abrevaya's
study compared "[r]atios for Black, Chinese, Filipino, Asian Indian and Korean ... to
those reported for White births. [The study] also determined sex ratios by birth order for
first, second and third or more children." Id. at 560-61. Ultimately, the researchers found
evidence strongly suggesting prenatal sex selection for third or more births among Chi-
nese, Indian, and Korean populations in the United States.
82. Douglas Almond & Lena Edlund, Son-Biased Sex Ratios in the 2000 United States
Census, 105 PROC. NAVL ACAD. Sci. U.S. AM. 5681, 5681 (2008), available at http://www.p
[Vol. 49:519532
TESTING SEX
first-born children was normal, subsequent children were more
likely to be male if there was no previous male child." If there
were no sons, the sex ratio for the third child was 1.51 males to
one female (as compared to a natural ratio of boy-girl births of
1.02 to 1.06 males for every one female)." Seema Mohapatra
notes that this ratio is comparable to ratios in South Korea, Chi-
na, and India."
In a qualitative study, researchers from the University of Cali-
fornia interviewed sixty-five South Asian American immigrants
who relied on sex selection technology between September 2004
and December 2009." Study participants reported coercion to
have sons and violence resulting from carrying or giving birth to
daughters." Participants reported that they felt pressure from
family members who perceived that sex-selective abortions were
readily available in the United States." Of the women inter-
viewed, 40% had already terminated prior pregnancies with fe-
male fetuses, and 89% of the women pregnant with female fetus-
es planned to pursue abortions."
The methods and conclusions of these studies have been con-
troversial. Sneha Barot concluded that the ethnic communities
studied constitute a very small proportion of the wider population
and that researchers have not shown the cause of disparate rati-
os, whether it be abortion or pre-pregnancy fertility treatments.0
nas.org/content/105/15/5681.full.pdf+html.
83. Id.
84. Jesudason & Shenker-Osorio, supra note 73 ("[W]omen will likely give birth to 100
girls for every 102 to 106 boys (for a ratio of 1.02 to 1.06 boys per girl).").
85. Seema Mohapatra, Global Legal Responses to Prenatal Gender Identification and
Sex Selection, 13 NEV. L.J. 690, 695-96 (2013).
86. Sunita Puri et al., "There Is Such a Thing as Too Many Daughters, But Not Too
Many Sons": A Qualitative Study of Son Preference and Fetal Sex Selection Among Indian
Immigrants in the United States, 72 SOC. SCl. & MED. 1169, 1170 (2011).
87. Id. at 1173 ("The most common forms of neglect were the withholding of food, wa-
ter, and rest during a woman's pregnancy with a female fetus, although women also de-
scribed being hit, pushed, choked, and kicked in the abdomen in a husband's attempt to
forcibly terminate a pregnancy.").
88. Id. at 1172 (noting that the pressure from family members increased with each
birth of a daughter).
89. Id. at 1170.
90. Sneha Barot, A Problem-and-Solution Mismatch: Son Preference and Sex-Selective
Abortion Bans, 15 GUTTMACHER POL'Y REV., Spring 2012, at 18, 21 (describing one study
as "a small-scale qualitative study" and "limited and inconclusive"); see also Almond & Ed-
lund, supra note 82, at 5681-82 ("[Blecause Indians, Chinese, and Koreans make up <2%
of the U.S. population, the effect on the breeding population sex ratio is small.").
2015] 533
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Moreover, a 2014 report, Replacing Myths with Facts: Sex-
Selective Abortion Laws in the United States, reviewed the first
(as compared to third) births of both foreign-born parents and
parents identifying with Indian, Chinese, or Korean ancestry and
found no evidence of son preference." In addition, the report
states, "[W]hen we compare the overall sex ratio at birth of for-
eign-born Chinese, Indian and Korean families to the sex ratio at
birth of whites born in the United States, we find that these
Asian groups have more girls on average than whites."92
The evidence of sex selection is clearly contested. Neither op-
ponents nor proponents of sex-selective abortion bans strengthen
their case by arguing that there is no desire to select for sex or
that sex selection is a rampant problem in this country. Indeed,
the studies described here offer only a glimpse into the diverse
practices of clinics and physicians' offices, and of individuals and
families. Likewise, the use of ART and reports from providers
confirm that prenatal sex determination occurs to some extent.
C. Clinical Availability
Physicians disagree about the ethics of sex selection." In a re-
cent survey, only 21% of physicians said they would offer sex de-
termination tests to pregnant women whose only motivation for
testing was to choose the sex of a future child." In contrast, a
2011 study of the attitudes of obstetricians and fertility special-
ists found that "providers believed that the advancement of sci-
ence in developing new, less expensive, less invasive, and more
private means of achieving sex selection was an important future
91. See BRIAN CITRO ET AL., REPLACING MYTHS WITH FACTS: SEX-SELECTIVE ABORTION
LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (Sujatha Jesudason et al. eds., 2014) [hereinafter
REPLACING MYTHS WITH FACTS], available at https://ihrclinic.uchicago.edu/page/replacing-
myths-facts-sex-selective-abortion-laws-united-states.
92. Id.
93. See Lauren C. Sayres et al., Cell-Free Fetal DNA Testing: A Pilot Study of Obstet-
ric Healthcare Provider Attitudes Toward Clinical Implementation, 31 PRENATAL
DIAGNOSIS 1070, 1071 (2011) (describing survey results, which concluded that 16% of med-
ical providers did not feel that patients should receive all available diagnostic prenatal
genetic testing, but 73% of medical providers felt that a test should be provided if a pa-
tient requests); cf. Wertz & Fletcher, Ethical and Social Issues, supra note 18, at 256-57
(explaining that most physicians respond differently depending on the situation of the pa-
tient).
94. See Sayres et al., supra note 93, at 1071-72.
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step."" For some providers, it is a question of protecting patient
autonomy and decision-making." For others, NIPT is the "latest
use of medical technology for social rather than therapeutic rea-
sons," and as one pediatrician commented, "there is so much
money to be made.""
Professional organizations have been cautious about what sex
selection means. For example, in a 2007 opinion, the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists ("ACOG") opposed us-
ing medical techniques to choose the sex of offspring (even for
family balancing) except in circumstances of sex-linked disease."
The ACOG opinion conceded, however, that "[bjecause a patient
is entitled to obtain personal medical information, including in-
formation about the sex of her fetus, it will sometimes be impos-
sible for health care professionals to avoid unwitting participa-
tion in sex selection."99
A 2004 statement of American Society for Reproductive Medi-
cine ("ASRM") on sex selection before conception stated, "Until a
more clearly persuasive ethical argument emerges, or there is
stronger empirical evidence that most choices to select the gender
of offspring would be harmful, policies to prohibit or condemn as
unethical all uses of nonmedically indicated preconception gender
selection are not justified.""oo
95. Puri & Nachtigall, supra note 63, at 2111.
96. See id. at 2110-11 (acknowledging the "personal and private nature of reproduc-
tive decision-making").
97. Id. at 2111.
98. AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS COMM. ON ETHICS, SEX
SELECTION 1 (2007) [hereinafter ACOG, SEX SELECTION], available at http://www.acog.
org/-/media/Committee%200pinions/Committee%200n%20Ethics/co360.pdf?dmc=1&ts=2
0130104T1829289757 ("The Committee on Ethics supports the practice of offering patients
procedures for the purpose of preventing serious sex-linked genetic diseases. However, the
committee opposes meeting requests for sex selection for personal and family reasons, in-
cluding family balancing, because of the concern that such requests may ultimately sup-
port sexist practices."). Seventy percent of respondents to a recent survey said they would
follow the guidance of professional organizations such as the ACOG in deciding which
types of testing to offer. Sayres, supra note 93, at 1072; see also Jesudason & Baruch, su-
pra note 35, at 599 (arguing that providers, like primary care physicians, should counsel
patients on parenting expectations and responsibilities).
99. ACOG, SEX SELECTION, supra note 98, at 4; see also Swanson et al., supra note 43,
at 117 ("[P]rofessional societies have unanimously agreed that NIPT is a safe and effective
screening test for fetal aneuploidy in high-risk women . .. None of the [professional] socie-
ties support the use of non-invasive prenatal tests in the low/average risk populations at
this time due to the lack of data.").
100. Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med., Preconception Gender Selection
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Evidence of the will to select sex prenatally also exists in the
use of PGD, a method of testing an embryo before implantation in
the uterus."o' These embryos are cultivated by in vitro fertiliza-
tion ("IVF"), and patients can choose to discard embryos for any
number of reasons, including sex.102 According to one study, "as of
2006, half of American fertility clinics that offer embryo screening
allow would-be parents some form of sex selective add-ons ...
and the market is growing."' Interviews with physicians suggest
"providers are increasingly encountering patients wanting to se-
lect the sex of their future children, including fertile couples with
no history of infertility or family genetic disease who seek [IVF]
and [PGD] simply to choose the sex of the child."" 4 Providers who
support PGD for sex-selection purposes argue that it helps "pre-
vent multiple pregnancies and abortions""' and is "the most hu-
for Nonmedical Reasons, 82 FERTILITY & STERILITY S232, S234 (2004). Swanson and Part
IV of this article argue that the ACOG, in a joint opinion with the Society of Maternal Fe-
tal Medicine, shifted more responsibility to providers by supporting the clinical use of
NIPT for certain populations of women. Swanson, supra note 43, at 114; see infra Part IV.
101. See King, Not This Child, supra note 24, at 59 n.299 (defining PGD).
102. See Judith F. Daar, ART and the Search for Perfectionism: On Selecting Gender,
Genes, and Gametes, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 241, 246, 249-50 (2005). Outside of PGD,
a small percentage of patients who choose the gender of a fetus rely on sperm sorting,
which has historically been unpredictable. MicroSort is a sperm-sorting tool commercial-
ized by the IVF Institute, which self-reports that "ninety-two percent of parents who re-
quested a female baby ended up with a female baby, and eighty-one percent of parents
who requested a male baby ended up with a male baby." Meredith Leigh Birdsall, Note,
An Exploration of "The 'Wild West' of Reproductive Technology": Ethical and Feminist Per-
spectives on Sex-Selection Practices in the United States, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
223, 229 (2010). But the efficacy and safety of MicroSort has been the subject of an FDA
investigation. Dov Fox, Safety, Efficacy, and Authenticity: The Gap Between Ethics and
Law in FDA Decision-making, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1135, 1143.
103. Jesudason & Shenker-Osorio, supra note 73.
104. Jesudason & Baruch, supra note 35, at 597. However, one study of prospective
mothers utilizing IVF coupled with PGD ("IVF-PGD") suggests stigma associated with sex
determination because study participants rejected it as frivolous or irresponsible. Michelle
McGowan, Constructions of Good Motherhood in an Online Forum for Users of Pre-
implantation Genetic Diagnosis, in MOTHERHOOD ONLINE 180, 191 (Michelle Moravec ed.,
2011). Women who decided to use IVF-PGD to screen for genetic mutations stated that
although they could conceive naturally and then undergo prenatal testing coupled with
abortion, IVF-PGD was more palatable because they would not be faced with the option of
aborting a wanted pregnancy. Id. at 186.
105. Puri & Nachtigall, supra note 63, at 2110; Ashley Bumgarner, Note, A Right to
Choose?: Sex Selection in the International Context, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1289,
1290 (2007) ("[Slome polls suggest that as many as twenty-five percent of Americans, and
forty percent of American women being treated for infertility, would prefer to choose the
sex of their next baby through preimplantation sex-selection procedures."). However, abor-
tion decisions are not absent in the context of ART. When multiple embryos are implanted
and more than two attach for gestation, patients may "selectively reduce" the pregnancy,
but such selective reduction has physical and ethical implications. See Theresa Glennon,
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mane, scientifically sound option for women."' Interestingly,
whether the patient sees a primary care physician or a fertility
physician appears to make a difference in how testing is offered.
Primary care physicians are hesitant to offer sex determination
testing for any reason; they are more likely to scrutinize a pa-
tient's reasons for selecting a particular sex, especially if the pro-
vider suspects spousal or family coercion."1' Reproductive endo-
crinologists are more likely to view the issue as a woman's
choice:?0" "There is a strong belief among both providers and pa-
tients that withholding any service is a denial of patients'
rights."09
PGD for sex determination is largely to obtain the "idealized
nuclear family" of an equal number of sons and daughters, alt-
hough there is evidence of son preference."' Some fertility ser-
vices target specific cultural groups that favor sons to daughters
by advertising the use of PGD for fetal sex selection."'
NIPT, or any other prenatal test, and PGD are not perfectly
analogous, but both technologies reflect a desire to consider sex
before or early in pregnancy. The new wave of sex-selective abor-
tion bans in the United States followed closely behind the intro-
duction of NIPT, and legislatures have taken up the case against
sex-selective abortion."2 The next part explores what these laws
and bills provide before Part III considers the origins of women's
rights claims in sex-selective abortion legislation.
Choosing One: Resolving the Epidemic of Multiples in Assisted Reproduction, 55 VILL. L.
REV. 147, 158 (2010).
106. Puri & Nachtigall, supra note 63, at 2110.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 2110.
109. Wertz & Fletcher, Ethical and Social Issues, supra note 18, at 261.
110. Richard R. Sharp et al., Moral Attitudes and Beliefs Among Couples Pursuing
PGD for Sex Selection, 21 REPROD. BIOMED. ONLINE 838, 845 (2010) www.rbmojournal.
comlarticle/S1472-6483(10)00623-1/fulltext (noting that in this particular study the major-
ity of participants (78%) were seeking to select a boy).
111. See Jesudason & Baruch, supra note 35, at 598.
112. Nora Hertel, SD Gender Abortion Ban Bill Criticized, Revised, WASH. TIMES (Mar.
3, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/mar/3/sd-panel-deadlocks-on-sex-sel
ection-abortion-ban/?page=all; Celeste McGovern, New Prenatal Testing Could Drastically
Increase Abortion Rate, NAT'L CATH. REG. (June 25, 2012), http://www.ncregister.com/dail
y-news/new-prenatal-testing-could-drastically-increase-abortion-rate/.
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II. LEGISLATIVE STRATEGIES TO BAN SEX SELECTION
Debate about sex selection dates back to the development of
amniocentesis in the 1950s and the application of ultrasound in
pregnancy in the 1960s." As these technologies became more
common-ultrasound became less expensive and more accurate
and amniocentesis became less dangerous and available earlier in
the second trimester-concerns about sex-selective abortion be-
came prevalent in ethical, medical, and legal conversations.114
The first U.S. legislation addressing sex-selective abortion is
nearly three decades old. In 1985, the Illinois legislature amend-
ed its abortion law to prohibit abortions performed "with
knowledge that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion sole-
ly on account of the sex of the fetus.""' In 1982, Pennsylvania
prohibited abortions unless the physician determined that,
"based on his [or her] best clinical judgment, the abortion [was]
necessary" and provided that "[n]o abortion which is sought solely
because of the sex of the unborn child shall be deemed a neces-
sary abortion.""' Pennsylvania's abortion statute became the ba-
sis of the challenge in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
113. See MARA HVISTENDAHL, UNNATURAL SELECTION: CHOOSING BOYS OVER GIRLS,
AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF A WORLD FULL OF MEN 115-18 (2011) (noting that critics of
ultrasound technology in the 1960s worried about the power of science to de-humanize fe-
tuses and the government exploitation and manipulation of populations); Kohm, supra
note 18, at 107-08 (tracing the practice of sex-selection arising for a male child to ancient
Greek philosophy); see also Ross Douthat, Op-Ed., Eugenics, Past and Future, N.Y. TIMES,
June 10, 2012, at SR12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/10/opinion/sunday/
douthat-eugenics-past-and-future.html?_r=O (questioning whether new technologies, like
NIPT, that facilitate parents' access to prenatal genetic information, will lead to a trouble-
some "liberal eugenics" in which parents are in complete control of choosing their chil-
dren's genetic characteristics); Jesudason & Shenker-Osorio, supra note 73 (linking NIPT
and the growing interest in sex selection).
114. See Amitai Etzioni, Sex Control, Science, and Society, 161 SCI. 1107, 1107-12
(1968); Jane M. Friedman, Legal Implications of Amniocentesis, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 92, 107
(1974) ("Behavioral scientists who have investigated the matter are virtually unanimous
in concluding that there is a strong preference for male offspring in the United States.").
Friedman noted that on one hand, gender imbalance could have harmful social effects, but
on the other, sex selection could slow population growth. Id.
115. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 510/6(8), amended by S.B. 890, 84th Gen. Assemb. (Ill.
1985). The law excludes abortions because of genetic disorders linked to sex. Id.
116. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3201(c) (1989).
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sylvania v. Casey,"' although litigators did not attack the sex-
selection provision."'
Today, anti-abortion strategies at the state level are succeed-
ing; legislatures across the country have begun to impose re-
strictions on patients' choices and options after prenatal testing.
This is against a backdrop in which states and the federal gov-
ernment have seldom regulated technologies for testing" and,
until recently, did not seek to shape or limit decisions made after
prenatal testing.12 This part examines the proposed laws and en-
acted statutes that prohibit sex-selective abortions.
117. 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
118. Linda Wharton, a lawyer representing the Women's Law Project in Casey stated:
"We didn't challenge the sex selection provision because it is a red herring." Michael de-
Courcy Hinds, Federal Judge Blocks a New Anti-Abortion Law in Pennsylvania, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 1990, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1990/01/12/us/federal-
judge-blocks-a-new-anti-abortion-law-in-pennsylvania.html.
119. Rachel Rebouch6 & Karen Rothenberg, Mixed Messages: The Intersection of Prena-
tal Genetic Testing and Abortion, 55 How. L.J. 983, 996 (2012) ("Like the federal govern-
ment, states generally do not regulate the specifics of prenatal genetic testing and screen-
ing and do not typically regulate how health care professionals offer screening or explain
or treat genetic disorders."). The Food and Drug Administration has not chosen to regulate
NIPT. Instead, it has considered NIPT a laboratory-developed test (developed and validat-
ed by a laboratory), which is governed by the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amend-
ments. See 42 C.F.R. § 493.1 (2013); see also Javitt, supra note 63, at 13-14 (noting the
FDA's ability to regulate medical devises used in the diagnosis of disease or other medical
conditions, including pregnancy, and that genetic tests are not classified as medical devic-
es). The Advisory Committee on Genetics for the Secretary of Health and Human Services
has noted the regulatory gaps and Congress has unsuccessfully tried to strengthen over-
sight over genetic tests. See Ronald L. Weiss, The Long and Winding Regulatory Road for
Laboratory-Developed Tests, 138 AM. J. CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 20, 23-24 (2012).
120. Increasingly, states seek to regulate if and how genetic counselors and physicians
discuss abortion. For instance, Missouri forbids state-sponsored genetic counseling pro-
grams from making a referral for an abortion unless the mother's life is in danger. Mo.
REV. STAT. § 191.320 (2013); Oklahoma makes it clear that genetic counselors are not re-
quired to mention abortion as an option. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-568 (2011). Tennessee for-
bids prenatal testing offered in state programs for a condition that cannot be cured. TENN.
CODE ANN. § 68-5-504(a)(2) (2013) ("[P]rocedures or services designed to search out disor-
ders in unborn children that are not treatable shall not be provided for under [this part].").
Arizona and Oklahoma protect doctors from lawsuits if they fail to disclose fetal abnormal-
ities to patients. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-719.C (2003) (shielding anyone from wrongful
birth or wrongful life claims regardless or "birth defect or other adverse medical condi-
tion"); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 1-741.12 (2011). Nebraska and Virginia incorporated refusal
rights for genetic counselors in the states' licensing laws for genetic counseling. NEB. REV.
STAT. § 38-3424 (2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2957.21 (2014).
2015] 539
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
A. State Laws and Bills
As noted, Pennsylvania and Illinois prohibited sex-selective
abortion decades ago;121 Arizona, 122 Oklahoma,123 North Carolina, 124
Kansas,'2 5 North Dakota,'2 6 and South Dakota'2 7 recently passed
laws restricting sex-selective abortions. Since 2010, twenty other
state legislatures have considered similar legislation seeking to
restrict sex-selective abortion.128
These bills and statutes are fairly uniform. State legislatures
use a template published by Americans United for Life ("AUL"),
an anti-abortion, non-profit group.'2 ' AUL's annual report, De-
fending Life, o contains model legislation for states, and in the
last several years, the report included a model sex-selective abor-
tion ban.'"' The model legislative findings state that "[t]he United
States, along with other countries, has petitioned the United Na-
tions General Assembly to declare sex-selective abortion a crime
against women;"1 2 that "[w]omen are a vital part of our society
and culture and possess the same fundamental human rights as
men;" and that "[a] large population of young, unmarried men
can be a cause of increased violence and militancy within a socie-
ty."13
121. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3204(c) (1989); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 510/6(8) (1975).
122. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02 (2010). Note that Arizona is the only state to
currently ban both sex- and race-based abortions.
123. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-731.2.B (2011).
124. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.121 (2013).
125. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-2246-79-3606 (2013).
126. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02 (2013).
127. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-64 (2011).
128. From 2010 to 2013, states considering sex-selective abortion bans included Arizo-
na, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin.
State Center, Monthly State Update: Major Developments in 2010, GUTTMACHER INST.
(Dec. 31, 2010), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/2010/dec.html.
129. Legislative Victories, AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE, http://www.aul.org/legislative-resourc
es/legislative-victories/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).
130. AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE, DEFENDING LIFE 2013 (2013), http://aul.org/featured-
images/AUL-1301_DL13%2OBook FINAL.pdf.
131. AMs. UNITED FOR LIFE, BAN ON ABORTIONS PERFORMED FOR REASONS OF SEX
SELECTION, POTENTIAL GENETIC DEFORMITY, OR POTENTIAL DISABILITY 249-59 (2012)
[hereinafter AUL MODEL LEGISLATION], available at http://www.aul.org/wp-content/uplo
ads/2012/04/model-ban-abortions-sex-selection.pdf.
132. Id. at 249.
133. Id. at 249-50.
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Prohibiting any person from performing an abortion "solely" on
account of sex, the AUL Model Legislation lists penalties for
states to customize, such as fines, imprisonment of open duration,
civil damages, and medical license revocation, as well as relief for
the pregnant woman from liability or criminal punishment.14 The
model suggests that states treat women terminating pregnancies
because of fetal sex, regardless of their intent, as victims, "enti-
tled to all rights, protections, and notifications afforded to crime
victims. ""
Although many states follow the AUL model, there are some
notable differences among bills and statutes.136 Most state legisla-
tion requires that sex be the "sole" reason for abortion, 7 but
some laws criminalize terminations in which sex is one of any
number of motivations.'38 The North Carolina law prohibits a
provider from terminating a pregnancy "with knowledge, or an
objective reason to know, that a significant factor in the woman
seeking the abortion is related to the sex of the unborn child.""
However, the same law clarifies that there is no "affirmative duty
on a physician to inquire as to whether the sex of the unborn
child is a significant factor."14' The Arizona statute does not ban
abortion "solely" because of sex; the law prohibits abortion "based
on the sex or race of the child or the race of a parent of that
child."14' Unlike North Carolina, Arizona requires physicians to
134. Id. at 254-55 ("Any physician or other person who intentionally or knowingly vio-
lates this Act is guilty of a [insert appropriate offense classification].").
135. Id. at 255.
136. With the exception of Kansas, New York, Florida, New Jersey, and Ohio, state
bills specifically track the AUL Model Legislation's "with knowledge" language, imposing
penalties on abortion performed intentionally for sex selection. See AUL MODEL
LEGISLATION, supra note 131, at 253. For a legislative example, 'see H.R. 98, 214 Gen. As-
semb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2014).
137. See AUL MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 131, at 253 (adopted by various states).
The model legislation makes an exception for "performance of an abortion because the un-
born child has a genetic disorder that is linked to the unborn child's sex." Id. It also pre-
serves application of the law after viability "[i]f this Section is held invalid as applied to
the period of pregnancy prior to viability." Id.
138. For example, in addition to examples provided in the text, proposed legislation in
Florida, Michigan, New Jersey, and Ohio does not contain the word "solely." See H.R. 845,
2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013); H.B. 5644, 97th Leg., 2014 Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2014); H.R.
2157, 215th Leg., 2012 Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2012); H.B. 7, 129th Gen. Assemb., 2012 Reg. Sess.
(Ohio. 2012).
139. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.121(a) (2013).
140. Id. § 90-21.121(b).
141. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02 (2011).
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sign an affidavit stating that the abortion is not based on sex or
race.214 The South Dakota law prohibits sex-selective abortions
that are "either solely or partly due to the unborn child's sex."143
Moreover, South Dakota now requires physicians to report to a
state agency: "(a) Whether the pregnant mother used a sex-
determining test; (b) What type of sex-determining test the preg-
nant mother used; and (c) The approximate gestational age of the
unborn child, in weeks, when the test was taken."144 Bills pro-
posed in West Virginia and Oregon do not require intent or
knowledge for a physician to be found guilty of performing a sex-
selective abortion.145
Also following the AUL Model Legislation, North Dakota en-
acted, and Missouri has considered, abortion bans for genetic ab-
normalities, detected by prenatal genetic tests. The North Dakota
legislation prohibits physicians from performing abortions solely
because "the unborn child has been diagnosed with either a ge-
netic abnormality or a potential for a genetic abnormality."'46 Leg-
islators in Missouri introduced a similar bill in 2013 that punish-
es doctors for performing abortions with knowledge that the
termination is sought solely because the child has been diagnosed
with a genetic abnormality or a potential for a genetic abnormali-
ty.147 This legislation moves in the opposite direction of the few
states that have explicitly permitted abortion because of serious
genetic conditions.14
B. The Federal Bill
PRENDA, first introduced as the Susan B. Anthony and Fred-
erick Douglass Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act, is the proposed
142. Id. § 36-2157 (2011).
143. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(3) (2014).
144. Id. § 34-23A-34 (2014).
145. H.R. 4034, 77th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2014); H.R. 2371, 81st Leg., Reg.
Sess. (W. Va. 2013) (noting that the physician is required to take "reasonable measures" to
determine the motivation of the woman).
146. H.R. 1305, 63d Leg. Assemb. § 2(1)(b) (N.D. 2013).
147. H.R. 386, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013) (noting that a violation of the
law could be a class A misdemeanor or a class D felony).
148. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-209(b)(2)(ii) (LexisNexis Repl. Vol.
2009); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 170.002(b)(3) (West 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-7-302(3)(b)(ii) (LexisNexis 2012).
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federal legislation regulating sex-selective abortions."' The pre-
sent Congress will likely not pass PRENDA and, even if it did,
President Barack Obama would likely not sign it. However, the
bill has been useful to the six states that recently passed sex-
selective abortion bans and the twenty states that considered
similar bills.5 o
Under PRENDA, any person who knowingly performs or facili-
tates "an abortion undertaken for purposes of eliminating an un-
born child of an undesired sex . .. [or] race""' may be fined; sen-
tenced to up to five years in prison; enjoined from further medical
practice; and face civil action by the patient, by the father of the
fetus, and by the parents of a minor patient.1 52 PRENDA does not
punish women that terminate their pregnancies.
Repeating the language in the AUL Model Legislation, the first
paragraphs of PRENDA read as a call for women's "fundamental
human rights."'8 The bill refers to studies described in Part I as
evidence of son preference in the United States, specifically in
immigrant communities "tracing their origins to countries where
sex-selection abortion is prevalent.""4 Sex selection is then de-
scribed as "barbaric" and "gender-based violence, predicated on
sex discrimination."' Invoking the U.S. experience with eugen-
ics,"' PRENDA, quoting the ASRM, states that sex selection
149. Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act of 2011, H.R. 447, 113th Cong. (2013); Susan B.
Anthony and Frederick Douglass Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act of 2011, H.R. 3541,
112th Cong. (2011); Susan B. Anthony and Frederick Douglass Prenatal Nondiscrimina-
tion Act of 2009, H.R. 1822, 111th Cong. (2009).
150. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
151. PRENDA § 250(h)(2)-(3).
152. Id. § 250(a)-(b).
153. Id. § 2(a)(1)(A); AUL MODEL LEGISLATION, supra note 131, at 4.
154. PRENDA § 2(a)(1)(F); see also supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
155. PRENDA § 2(a)(1)(D).
156. PRENDA's section on race receives far less attention than sex selection and
grounds its legislative justification in civil rights and anti-eugenics movements:
A thorough review of the history of the American population control move-
ment and its close affiliation with the American Eugenics Society reveals a
history of targeting certain racial or ethnic groups for "family planning." This
history likely contributes to the current statistic that a Black baby is five
times as likely to be aborted as a White baby, often in a federally subsidized
clinic.
Id. § 2(a)(2)(D)-(E). However, as many commentators have noted rightly, the troubling
and confusing invocation of race and racial eugenics "promote[s] anti-immigrant senti-
ments, stigmatize[s] and discriminate[s] against women of color by suggesting they can't
be trusted to make their own reproductive health care decisions." Pieklo, supra note 15.
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"trivialize[s] human reproduction by making it depend on the se-
lection of non-essential features of offspring."
Sex-selective abortions, according to PRENDA, "are often the
product of violent coercion,"'5 and such coercion exacerbates the
vulnerability women face in pregnancy."' PRENDA claims that
women who abort because of fetal sex feel "guilt, shame and sad-
ness over their inability to 'save' the daughters they had abort-
ed.""o According to the bill, echoing other anti-abortion argu-
ments, women terminating pregnancies experience mental
illness, depression, and increased risk of physical and chronic
pain. 161
PRENDA also emphasizes the purported costs of sex imbal-
ance:
Experts worldwide document that a significant sex-ratio imbalance
in which males numerically predominate can be a cause of increased
violence and militancy within a society. Likewise, an unnatural sex-
ratio imbalance gives rise to the commoditization of humans in the
form of human trafficking, and a consequent increase in kidnapping
and other violent crime . . . . Sex-selection abortions have the effect
of diminishing the representation of women in the American popula-
tion, and therefore, the American electorate .... Sex-selection abor-
tion reinforces sex discrimination and has no place in a civilized so-
ciety.16
PRENDA invokes human rights arguments and cites to the work
of the UN Commission on the Status of Women."' The bill also re-
fers to the work of political philosopher Amartya Sen, who esti-
157. PRENDA § 2(a)(1)(K) (citing a 2004 Ethics Committee Opinion as well as the
ACOG 2007 Ethics Committee Opinion, Number 360). Seema Mohapatra argues that
PRENDA misrepresents the ASRM's opinion in that the Society has reserved condemna-
tion of sex selection until there is better proof of harm caused by the practice. Mohapatra,
supra note 85, at 714.
158. PRENDA § 2(a)(1)(L)(i).
159. See id. § 2(a)(1)(L)(ii)-(iii) (listing various forms of coercion caused by sex selection
situations, as well as stating that homicide is "the most common cause of death for preg-
nant women").
160. Id. § 2(a)(1)(L)(iii).
161. Id. § 2(a)(1)(M). See generally Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protec-
tion: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694 (2008) (describing
the strategies of anti-abortion advocates, as well as the writings of the Supreme Court of
the United States, that seek to restrict abortion under the banner of protecting women).
162. PRENDA § 2(a)(1)(N)-(P).
163. Id. § 2(a)(1)(H) (stating that the United States led a delegation at the U.N. Com-
mission session condemning sex-selective abortion).
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mated that 100 million women are missing because of poor
treatment of girls and preference for boys. 64
PRENDA situates the United States as contributing to the
world epidemic of gendercide."" The bill makes two claims about
the consequences of leaving sex selection unregulated: the first is
that the United States will become a "safe haven" for parents
seeking to evade another country's ban.16 The second is that the
United States is out of step with international condemnation of
sex selection by failing to pass a law criminalizing it.'6 1 PRENDA
compares the United States to India and China where son prefer-
ence has been addressed by national legislation."' The Replacing
Myths with Facts report notes, however, that male-biased sex ra-
tios are higher in several other countries and those countries are
not overly represented in U.S. immigrant communities.' And a
number of countries legislate to express disapproval of the prac-
tice but do not have skewed sex ratios."'o Many other countries'
laws that pertain to sex selection in IVF procedures or sperm
sorting do not explicitly prohibit abortion. "
164. Id. § 2(a)(1)(I); Amartya Sen, More Than 100 Million Women Are Missing, 37 N.Y.
REV., Dec. 20, 1990, at 61 (1990). Sen noted the paradox that son preference persists even
at a moment when economic development in varying countries should be improving the
lives of women and girls. Id. However, Sen did not specifically address sex-selective abor-
tion. See also Amartya Sen, Gender Inequality and Theories of Justice, in WOMEN
CULTURE & DEVELOPMENT 259 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Jonathan Glover eds., 1995) (dis-
cussing gender inequalities in various fields).
165. See PRENDA § 2(a)(1)(E)-(F).
166. Id. § 2(a)(1)(J).
167. Id.; see also Lusine Aghajanova & Cecilia T. Valdes, Sex Selection for Nonhealth-
Related Reasons, 14 VIRTUAL MENTOR: AM. MED. Ass'N J. ETHICS 105, 107 (2012), http://
www.virtualmentor.ama-assn.org/2012/02/pdf/ccas3-1202.pdf (stating that five countries
prohibit sex selection "for any reason, while 31 countries prohibit it for social or nonmedi-
cal reasons").
168. PRENDA § 2(a)(1)(J).
169. REPLACING MYTHS WITH FACTS, supra note 91, at 8.
170. Compare id. at 9 tbls.1 & 2 (listing countries with skewed sex ratios), with id. at
10 & 33-34 n.45 (citing countries that have legislated on sex selection practices but do not
have skewed sex-ratios at birth).
171. See, e.g., Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2 (Can.) (banning sex
selection procedures to determine fetal sex, like sperm sorting or in vitro sex determina-
tion, but not banning sex-selective abortion or sex determination technologies during
pregnancy). Australia's sex selection ban largely exists through national guidelines pro-
hibiting nonmedically necessary sex selection in all accredited facilities and physician's
offices. See Review of Sex Selection, HUMAN FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTH. (Feb. 1,
2012), http://www.hfea.gov.uk/517.html. South Australia and Western Australia have
banned sex selection using reproductive technology when there is no risk of genetic disor-
der. See Sex Selection & Abortion: Australia, LIB. OF CONG. (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.
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However, PRENDA's sponsor, Representative Trent Franks,
called sex selection a common ground issue for advocates and op-
ponents of abortion.'7 2 Representative Franks of Arizona empha-
sized the bill's symbolic importance, responding to the problems
of enforcing sex-selective abortion bans."' In most states there
are no requirements for patients to disclose their reasons for
abortions."' Even if state laws require providers to ask patients
to disclose their motives, clinics are not equipped with lie-
detector tests and cannot prohibit a patient from visiting another
provider."' Thus, after testing for any fetal characteristic, the
larger challenge of how a state could dictate and police patients'
decisions remains.
One may not believe that Representative Franks seeks com-
mon ground with reproductive rights supporters, just as one may
seriously doubt that PRENDA is an authentic call for women's
rights."' These laws are one of several anti-abortion strategies
seeking to criminalize all abortion in the United States.177 But
these bans enjoy popularity in part because opposition to sex se-
lection has a long and rich history steeped in women's rights ac-
loc.gov/law/help/sex-selection/australia.php.
172. Lauren Vogel, Sex-Selective Abortions: No Simple Solution, 184 CAN. MED. ASSOC.
J. 286, 286 (2012). The common ground between abortion supporters and opponents, ac-
cording to the congressional materials supporting PRENDA, is "the desire to combat dis-
crimination." H.R. REP. No. 112-496, at 15 (2012).
173. See Vogel, supra note 172, at 286-87 (discussing the difficulty of enforcing sex-
selection bans in various countries, but reasoning that "it's also true that sometimes the
law is a teacher. . . . There's something about the law saying that this is something as a
society that we collectively agree is wrong that begins to cause people to look at their own
conscience in that regard"); see also Kohm, supra note 18, at 120 (noting that the use of
the adjective "solely" could render the statute virtually useless if a mother simply states
she is aborting based on non-sex-selection reasons).
174. A few states now require physicians to record and to report to law enforcement or
a governmental agency the reasons patients give for seeking abortions. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. § 390.0112 (2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-738k (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-
23A-34 (2004).
175. See Kohm, supra note 18, at 120 ("[I]t is impossible to estimate how many [abor-
tions] are truly performed for purposes of sex selection, as women never have to disclose
their reason for obtaining an abortion.").
176. Mohapatra, supra note 85, at 720 ("In the United States, PRENDA and the sex-
selective state laws seem more concerned with weakening a general right to choose rather
than a sincere commitment to gender equality. In contrast, countries in Asia and Europe
aim to curb son preference by restricting access to gender identification technology and
abortion services.").
177. See REPLACING MYTHS WITH FACTS, supra note 91, at 21 ("Restricting access to
abortion is the primary motivation for sex-selective abortion bans. All the bans have been
proposed and supported by people who oppose abortion generally.").
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tivism. Gender discrimination and violence against women have
been the narratives defining an international agenda against sex
selection that helped justify legal intervention abroad.'
The next part describes the origins of the violence and discrim-
ination narratives of PRENDA and similar bills. It demonstrates
how the debate in the United States relied on the language of an
international human rights movement and advanced a solution-
a criminal ban-that reproductive rights advocates sought to
avoid.
III. SEX SELECTION GOES ABROAD AND COMES HOME
Over the last thirty years, commentators have made varying
moral and ethical arguments against sex selection-that son
preference is inherently sexist, stereotyped, and immoral.'" For
some ethicists, sex selection for any reason is "steeped in the
same kind of gendered social norms and expectations as prefer-
ences that lead to sex ratio imbalances in other countries."8 o
Many have worried that sex determination is the first step down
a slippery road of eugenics, genetic manipulation, and genetic de-
terminism, allowing potential parents to select for nonmedical,
genetic characteristics.'
As repeated in contemporary debates, sex selection is the prod-
uct of, and leads to, widespread discrimination and violence
against women. Writing in 1968 in response to the emergence of
amniocentesis, sociologist Amitai Etzioni reported "both profes-
sional forecasters of the future and leading scientists see sex con-
178. See Aghajanova & Valdes, supra note 167, at 107-08; Mohapatra, supra note 85,
at 718.
179. See Jesudason & Baruch, supra note 35, at 597 ("There are serious social and eth-
ical concerns at stake in sex selection that require deeper, more long-term considera-
tion. . . ."). But see Robertson, Genetic Selection, supra note 18, at 457 (arguing that
"[g]iven the cost and inconvenience associated even with preconception techniques, cou-
ples are not likely to use such methods in such numbers that they will affect gender ratios
or otherwise harm the interests of women").
180. Jesudason & Baruch, supra note 35, at 597; see also Wertz & Fletcher, Fatal
Knowledge?, supra note 18, at 25.
181. See Danis, supra note 18, at 240-41; see, e.g., Mark Evans et al., Attitudes on the
Ethics of Abortion, Sex Selection, and Selective Pregnancy Termination Among Health
Care Professionals, Ethicists, and Clergy Likely to Encounter Such Situations, 164 Am. J.
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1092, 1092-99 (1991).
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trol as a mass practice in the foreseeable future."182 Etzioni ex-
pressed the same concerns of current sex selection bills: Parents
would be susceptible to son preference, given then-recent studies
that parents preferred boys to girls,'"' and that "cumulative male
surplus will thus produce a society with some of the rougher fea-
tures of a frontier town,"84 resulting in "the diminution of the
number of agents of moral education and the increase in the
fb * *,,185number of criminals.
Women's rights advocates have made similar arguments about
the effect of sex selection. Focusing on China, India, and a few
other countries, women's rights activists brought to light the dis-
proportionate ratio of sons to daughters and the booming busi-
ness of ultrasound technology for sex determination.8 "'
Yet activists have not agreed about the best mode or form of
regulation. Reproductive rights advocates may not have wanted
prohibitions on abortion, but their interventions in sex selection
182. Etzioni, supra note 114, at 1108.
183. Id. A 2011 Gallup Poll suggested that Americans prefer boys to girls:
If Americans could have only one child, they would prefer that it be a boy ra-
ther than a girl, by a 40% to 28% margin, with the rest having no preference
or no opinion on the matter. These attitudes are remarkably similar to what
Gallup measured in 1941, when Americans preferred a boy to a girl by a 38%
to 24% margin.
Frank Newport, Americans Prefer Boys to Girls, Just as They Did in 1941, GALLUP (June
23, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/148187/Americans-Prefer-Boys-Girls-1941.aspx?utm
source=alert&utmmedium=email&utmscampaign=syndication&utm content=morelink
utm term=USA.
184. Etzioni, supra note 114, at 1109.
185. Id. (invoking race and class dynamics (and stereotypes)). Etzioni wrote,
"[i]nterracial and interclass tensions are likely to be intensified because some groups, low-
er classes and minorities specifically, seem to be more male oriented than the rest of the
society." Id.
186. U.N. Dep't of Pub. Info., Incest, Rape and Domestic Violence, 2, U.N. Doc.
DPI/17721HR (Feb. 1996) [hereinafter Incest, Rape and Domestic Violence], http://www.
un.org/rights/dpil772e.htm ("According to reports from India, genetic testing for sex selec-
tion has become a booming business, especially in the country's northern regions. Indian
gender-detection clinics drew protests from women's groups after the appearance of adver-
tisements suggesting that it was better to spend $38 now to terminate a female foetus
than $3,800 later on her dowry. A study of amniocentesis procedures conducted in a large
Bombay hospital found that 95.5 per cent of foetuses identified as female were aborted,
compared with a far smaller percentage of male foetuses."); see also, e.g., Christopher S.
Wren, Old Nemesis Haunts China on Birth Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 1982), http://www.
nytimes.com/1982/08/01/world/old-nemesis-haunts-china-on-birth-plan.html.
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abroad, reflecting a disagreement among feminists, may have in-
advertently promoted criminal bans.187
A. Responses to Sex Selection Abroad
International human rights law rejects sex selection. The 180
signatories of the International Conference on Population and
Development Programme of Action ("ICPD") pledged "[t]o elimi-
nate all forms of discrimination against the girl child . . . which
results in . .. prenatal sex selection."" In 2011, the World Health
Organization, in collaboration with the United Nations Popula-
tion Fund Activities ("UNFPA"), UN Women, and other organiza-
tions, issued a statement denouncing sex selection."" The mean-
ing of "sex selection" varies in these documents and U.N.
documents often list different, cultural practices together."o Son
preference can happen prenatally, with abortion or with PGD, or
after birth through neglect of girl children or female infanticide. 91
Public attention to the particular issue of sex-selective abortion
grew out of the population control movement and the politics of
procreative decision-making. Beginning in the 1950s and gather-
187. This part draws from chapter two of JANET HALLEY ET AL., GOVERNANCE
FEMINISM: AN INTRODUCTION 14, 20 (forthcoming 2015) (on file with author).
188. International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, Egypt, Sept. 5-
13, 1994, Report of the International Conference on Population and Development, 4.16(a),
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13 (Oct. 18, 1994) [hereinafter Int'l Rep. on Population & Dev.]
Moreover, the ICPD Programme for Action states: "Governments are urged to prohibit fe-
male genital mutilation" and to "prevent infanticide, prenatal sex selection, trafficking in
girl children and use of girls in prostitution and pornography." Id. 4.22-.23
189. WORLD HEALTH ORG., PREVENTING GENDER-BIASED SEX SELECTION: AN
INTERAGENCY STATEMENT OHCHR, UNFPA, UNICEF, UN WOMEN AND WHO v-vi (2011)
[hereinafter WHO INTERAGENCY STATEMENT], available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publi
cations/2011/9789241501460_eng.pdf.
190. The Beijing Platform states: "Acts of violence against women also include forced
sterilization and forced abortion, coercive/forced use of contraceptives, female infanticide
and prenatal sex selection." Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, China, Sept. 4-
15, 1995, Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, 115, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
177/ 20 (Oct. 17, 1995), available at http://www.un.org/esa/gopher-datalconf/fwcw/offla--
20.en.
191. See Dinesh C. Sharma, Widespread Concern Over India's Missing Girls, 362
LANCET 1553, 1553 (2003) (explaining that female infanticide is still a major problem in
some countries); Ram Mashru, It's a Girl: The Three Deadliest Words in the World, INDEP.
(Jan. 18, 2012, 11:46 AM), http:/fblogs.independent.co.uk/2012/01/16/it's-a-girl-the-three-
deadliest-words-in-the-world/ ("Gendercide in South Asia takes many forms: baby girls are
killed or abandoned if not aborted as foetuses. Girls that are not killed often suffer malnu-
trition and medical neglect as sons are favoured when shelter, medicine and food are
scarce.").
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ing momentum in the 1960s, demographers predicted unmanage-
ably high birth rates, leading to shortages of food and energy re-
sources.'9 2 In the United States, both major political parties listed
population control as a legislative priority. Conservatives tended
to focus on stemming the spread of communism, and progressives
tended to focus on the relationship between stretched resources,
hunger, and poverty.'
American-backed organizations, such as the Ford Foundation
and the Population Council, and donors like John D. Rockefeller
III, Hugh Moore, and Lewis Strauss, funded population control
activities.'94 These efforts helped create the UNFPA. In 1967,
United Nations Secretary General U Thant proposed creating a
fund to address population issues through research, training, and
advising."' The technical nature of the proposed program coupled
with the controversial topic of family planning led the United Na-
tions to create a separate organization that relied exclusively on
voluntary contributions."' The program was transferred to the
United Nations Development Program ("UNDP") when it became
operational in 1969,'1 and, by 1972, fifty-two countries had made
voluntary contributions."' As a result of this fundraising success,
the UNFPA moved from the UNDP to its present place as a sub-
sidiary organ of the United Nations General Assembly."' The
U.S. government took a crucial role in forming the UNFPA and
192. See Republican Party Platform of 1968, PRESIDENCY (Aug. 5, 1968), http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/?pid=25841; Written Statement from Matthew Connelly,
Prof. of History, Colum. U., to the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Subcomm. on Africa,
Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations, Confronting the
Legacies of Population Control: Historical Perspectives on the Global Spread of Sex-
Selective Abortion, 3-4 (2013) (referencing PAUL R. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB 18-
19 (1971)).
193. See MICHELLE GOLDBERG, THE MEANS OF REPRODUCTION: SEX, POWER, AND THE
FUTURE OF THE WORLD 41, 44-45 (2009); see also Republican Party Platform of 1968,
PRESIDENCY 8-10 (Aug. 5, 1968), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/?pid=25841.
194. HVISTENDAHL, supra note 113, at 32-33.
195. RACHEL SULLIVAN ROBINSON, WORKING GROUP ON U.N. POPULATION FUND
ACTIVITIES, UNFPA IN CONTEXT: AN INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 6-7 (2010), available at http:
//www.cgdev.org/doc[UNFPA-in-Context.pdf.
196. Id. at 7.
197. Id. at 6-7.
198. Id. at 8.
199. Id. The UNFPA continued to share a governing council with the UNDP until
1980. Id.
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the United States was the largest contributor for the first decade
of the UNFPA's existence.200
The UNFPA became a leader for a population control move-
ment that initially appeared indifferent to sex selection.201 In the
1980s, women's rights advocates as well as anti-abortion advo-
cates criticized the UNFPA for complicity in coercive abortions
under China's one-child policy (implemented in 1979).202 Historian
Matthew Connelly argued before a Congressional hearing that
American scientists, aid officials, and activists played leading
roles . . . promot[ing] sex-selective abortion as a potential solution to
what they saw as the population explosion .. . [I]t is precisely be-
cause the U[.]S[.] took a leading role in advocating population con-
trol worldwide that we cannot pretend that we have no responsibil-
ity for the consequences.203
Women's rights advocates mobilized against population politics
that implicitly or explicitly encouraged forced sterilization, abor-
tion, and contraceptive use. 204 The 1974 U.N. World Population
Conference agenda included only a brief mention of individuals'
200. Chad M. Gerson, Toward an International Standard of Abortion Rights: Two Ob-
stacles, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 753, 760 (2005).
201. Mara Hvistendahl's account of the U.S. influence on the population control move-
ments in India was cited as a shameful past in a recent congressional hearing. India's
Missing Girls: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Africa, Global Health, Global Human
Rights, & International Organizations of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 113th Cong.
24-25 (2013) [hereinafter Hearing on India's Missing Girls] (statement of Sabu M.
George) (claiming that "American government and foundations, institutions... have
spent up to 60 years advocating and funding population control measures in India").
202. See 131 CONG. REC. S. 4133 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1985) (statement of Jeremiah An-
drew Denton, Jr.). In response, in 1984, the Reagan Administration issued a now infa-
mous executive order that prohibited recipients of U.S. foreign aid, such as women's rights
non-governmental organizations outside of the United States, from offering abortion ser-
vices (unless there was a threat of rape, incest, or a threat to a woman's life), providing
counseling or referral for abortion, or lobbying for liberalized abortion laws. This order,
also known as the "global gag rule," has been a partisan issue. President Ronald Reagan
introduced it in 1984, President Bill Clinton repealed it in 1992, President George W.
Bush reinstated it in 2001, and most recently, President Obama repealed it in 2009. Dem-
ocrats in the House of Representatives offered an unsuccessful bill to permanently repeal
the global gag rule. Global Democracy Promotion Act, H.R. 2639, 112th Cong. (2011).
203. Connelly, supra note 192, at 3, 9.
204. See HVISTENDAHL, supra note 113, at 121-22 (noting how feminist groups and
others on the left organized and advocated for a more humane approach to population con-
trol); see also Reed Boland, The Environment, Population, and Women's Human Rights, 27
LEWIS & CLARK J. ENVTL. L. 1137, 1160, 1164 (1997) (discussing the difficulties of imple-
menting population control measures that respect human rights). But see Mary Ziegler,
The Framing of a Right to Choose: Roe v. Wade and the Changing Debate on Abortion
Law, 27 LAW & HIST. REV. 281, 282 (2009) (noting the complicated relationship between
the population control movement and the abortion rights movement in the United States).
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rights to reproductive decision-making.20 5 Women's rights advo-
cates committed time and organizing efforts to change the con-
versation from birth rates to reproductive wellness and choice.
They achieved remarkable success in reshaping the population
and development agenda to include gender equality and repro-
ductive rights. 20" The 1994 ICPD, which emphasized both human
rights and women's empowerment, represents the culmination of
that activism.07
The means by which countries should curb sex selection, how-
ever, remained a thorny issue. Women's rights advocates, on the
one hand, condemned son preference, but on the other hand, re-
sisted laws restricting abortion or testing decisions. Reproductive
rights supporters have taken two approaches to this issue. The
first is an anti-discrimination approach, now adopted by United
Nations bodies, such as the UNFPA, and advocated by women's
rights organizations. The goal of this approach is to root out gen-
der inequality through positive law reform and educational cam-
paigns, which are solutions that notably avoid banning sex-based
abortion. International organizations and women rights groups
have been very careful about how they refer to sex-selective abor-
tion.208 The second approach treats sex selection as violence, cast-
ing son preference both as private violence against women and
public violence affecting society when men outnumber women.
These narratives coexist in PRENDA, but PRENDA capitalizes
205. Rep. of the U.N. World Population Conference, 1974, 1 32, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.
60/19 (1974).
206. Feminists intervened to shape the population control agenda in the 1960s and
1970s. For example, graduate students in 1969 founded Concerned Demography.
HVISTENDAHL, supra note 113, at 121.
207. Alicia Ely Yamin, Sexual Reproductive Health, Rights, and MDG 5: Taking Stock,
Looking Forward, in THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE 232, 235 (Malcolm Langford, Andrew Sumner & Alicia Ely Yamin
eds., 2013); Int'l Rep. on Population & Dev., supra note 188, 1 4.1. Fourth World Confer-
ence on Women, Beijing, China, Sept. 4-15, 1995, Beijing Declaration and Platform for
Action, ch. 1, 3, U.N. Doc. DPI/1766/Wom, Annex 1 (Feb. 1996) [hereinafter Beijing Plat-
form for Action]; Dianne Otto, The Exile of Inclusion: Reflections on Gender Issues in In-
ternational Law over the Last Decade, 10 MELB. J. INT'L L. 11, 18-19 (2009).
208. The World Bank's World Development Report, "Gender Equality and Develop-
ment," calls for two actions, although it does not mention abortion: "First, laws need to be
enacted and enforced to deal with the abuse of sex selection technologies," and second, pol-
icies should "enhance household perceptions of the value of daughters." THE WORLD BANK,
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2012: GENDER EQUALITY AND DEVELOPMENT 23-24 (2012).
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on the latter's ambivalence toward banning sex-selective abor-
*209tion.
1. The Discrimination Approach
PRENDA begins, "Son preference is reinforced by the low value
associated ... with female off spring . . . . 'Son preference' is one
of the most evident manifestations of sex or gender discrimina-
tion in any society."210 This language could have been lifted from a
2011 United Nations inter-agency statement on sex selection. As
stated by UN Women, "[p]re-natal sex selection and sex selective
abortions are forms of discrimination against women and are
symptomatic of the devalued status of women in society."2 11 U.N.
documents-publications that may not share PRENDA's regula-
tory solution-explain son preference as a problem of legal and
cultural discrimination made possible with technology for sex de-
termination.'
International human rights bodies and women's rights advo-
cates call for formal law reform that puts women and girls on
equal footing with men and boys. This includes amending inher-
itance laws, guaranteeing equal pay and access to paid employ-
ment, and eradicating dowry practices.2 1 3 In addition, reports call
for financial incentives for parents with daughters, such as hous-
ing and pension payments, college and school scholarships for
girls, and "awareness-raising programmes conducted by both
governments and nongovernmental organizations."' As a com-
plement to formal law reform, advocates press for community ed-
209. There is rich and substantial literature on the nature and meaning of violence
against women. In describing the limited accounts of the violence of sex selection, this ar-
ticle does not intend to conflate societal, individual, state, cultural, or other forms (and
consequences) of violence against women. See generally KRISTIN BUMILLER, IN AN ABUSIVE
STATE: How NEOLIBERALISM APPROPRIATED THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT AGAINST SEXUAL
VIOLENCE 7-15, 18-30 (2008) (complicating types of violence, state power, and feminist
activism). For a full discussion of the feminist arguments on violence described in this and
the following section, see section two of chapter one of JANET HALLEY ET AL., GOVERNANCE
FEMINISM: AN INTRODUCTION (forthcoming 2015) (on file with the author).
210. PRENDA § 2(a)(1)(E).
211. UN WOMEN, HANDBOOK FOR LEGISLATION ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN:
"HARMFUL PRACTICES" AGAINST WOMEN 4 (2012).
212. See id. at 4; see also WHO INTERAGENCY STATEMENT, supra note 189, at 6; Cherry,
supra note 18, at 161-63, 168-73.
213. WHO INTERAGENCY STATEMENT, supra note 189, at vi.
214. Id. at 7.
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ucation and political awareness aimed at the reasons parents
might prefer boys to girls."'
Preference for non-discrimination measures reflects discomfort
with or distrust of restrictions on abortion. Mara Hvistendahl re-
counts an interview with a UNFPA officer who stated, "[H]ow do
you hold on to this discrimination tag and at the same time talk
about safe abortion and access to it?"21 6 In accord with an interna-
tional reproductive rights agenda, U.N. documents try to dis-
suade countries from restricting abortion (based on the reason for
termination) or overly limiting access to ultrasound or other
technology. Hvistendahl argues that by the 1990s most women's
rights advocates were too attached to abortion rights to contem-
plate laws prohibiting sex-selective abortions.217 Indeed, since the
1994 ICPD, women's rights advocates have gained clearer recog-
nition of abortion rights at international and regional levels;
there is a global movement of women's rights activists that has
won international support for unencumbered rights to abortion.218
215. Some advocates connected sex selection to women's experiences as mothers who
negotiate cultural sexism for strategic reasons. Bans on certain practices (as well as edu-
cational campaigns) were instituted by "outsiders" who "change community by force" by
enacting a type of "cultural imperialism." Rosemarie Tong, Blessed Are the Peacemakers:
Commentary on Making Peace in Gestational Conflicts, 13 THEORETICAL MED. 329 (1992);
Deniz Kandiyotti, Bargaining with Patriarchy, 2 GENDER & SoC'Y 274, 274 (1988) (dis-
cussing woman-based strategies for optimizing life options in the face of oppression). Gail
Weiss, for example, applied work on the ethic of care to the sex selection debate. Drawing
from the work of Sara Ruddick, Weiss argued that women use "maternal thinking" when
they deploy sex selection for the economic and social standing of their families. Gail Weiss,
Sex-Selective Abortion: A Relational Approach, 10 HYPATIA 202, 207 (1995) (citing SARA
RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE (1989)); see also Sarah Di-
tum, Why Women Have a Right to Sex-Selective Abortion, GUARDIAN (Sept. 19, 2013 7:40
PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/19/sex-selective-abortion-wom
ans-right ("But what about when a pregnant woman lives in a society that gives her real
and considerable reason to fear having a girl? ... In those situations, a woman wouldn't
just be justified in seeking sex selective abortion; she'd be thoroughly rational to do so.").
216. HVISTENDAHL, supra note 113, at 150.
217. Id. at 150-51; see also MARY ANN WARREN, GENDERCIDE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF
SEX SELECTION 104 (1985) (discussing whether sex selection is an acceptable reason for
abortion, and noting that because early abortion in general "raises no serious moral is-
sues, then early sex-selective abortion is morally no more problematic than preconceptive
sex selection"). See generally ROSALIND POLLACK PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S
CHOICE: THE STATE, SEXUALITY, AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM v-vii, 286-92, 295-301
(1984) (describing strategies that advance autonomy and privacy arguments, but noting
that abortion advocates in the 1980s understood those arguments' limitations and contra-
dictions).
218. See also Rachel Rebouch6, How Reproductive Rights Travel, 24 SOC. & LEGAL
STUD. 3-4 (forthcoming 2015) (describing the culmination of women's rights activism
around an international right to abortion).
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That activism borrows from liberal feminist ideas about women's
rights to autonomy-ideas that have been formative to U.S. abor-
tion rights.2 19 As described by April Cherry, "[T]he principles of
liberalism and liberal feminism demand that each individual
woman be permitted to make choices regarding the continuation
of her pregnancy using whatever criteria she wishes. Prohibitions
against sex-selective abortion are in conflict with these princi-
ples."220 The UNFPA's position is the same-that restricting ac-
cess to certain reproductive technologies or to safe abortion
threatens the human rights of women.
At the same time, evidence of sex-selective practices has made
education and political awareness campaigns seem insufficient.22 1
Sex selection as violence, with an implicit support for prohibition
or criminalization, identifies son preference as a universally ab-
horrent and abusive practice-an argument available for co-
optation by anti-abortion activists.
2. The Violence Approach
Sex selection as violence-both violence against individual
women and society-level violence-also characterizes interna-
tional human rights law. The Fourth World Conference on Wom-
en, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (the "Beijing
Platform for Action") defines sex selection as an act of violence:
"Acts of violence against women also include forced sterilization
and forced abortion, coercive/forced use of contraceptives, female
infanticide and prenatal sex selection.""' UN Women lists sex se-
lection with "harmful cultural or traditional practices," which in-
clude "female genital mutilation, female infanticide, . . . child
marriage, forced marriage, dowry-related violence, acid at-
219. Sital Kalantry notes, however, that "advocating for a universal opposition to pro-
hibitions on sex selection is another form of imperialist feminism-exporting mainstream
American feminism to other parts of the world." Sital Kalantry, Sex Selection in the Unit-
ed States and India: A Contextualist Feminist Approach, 18 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN
AFF. 61, 78 (2013).
220. Cherry, supra note 18, at 207.
221. See generally Kalantry, supra note 219, at 71-78.
222. Beijing Platform for Action, supra note 207, T 115. Hvistendahl reports that
UNFPA officers are warned to "stay away" from the Beijing definition, because the Plat-
form's treatment of sex selection could imply support for abortion restrictions and for fetal
personhood. HVISTENDAHL, supra note 113, at 153.
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tacks, ... 'hounor' crimes, and maltreatment of widows."223 The
United Nations Department of Public Information grouped sex-
selective abortion with infanticide and neglect or denial of nutri-
tion, basic health care, or education for daughters: "Some females
fall prey to violence before they are born, when expectant parents
abort their unborn daughters, hoping for sons instead."2 4
Violence claims hold individual women blameless: Women who
abort female fetuses suffer coercion and are the likely subjects of
domestic violence.225 Internal directives of the UNFPA "instruct
employees to emphasize the powerlessness of women requesting
sex selection." 226 Likewise, PRENDA asserts that pregnant wom-
en are subject "to varying degrees of verbal and physical abuse,
which may be to the point of actually inducing a sex-selection
abortion."227 Pregnant women are thus victims and not decision-
makers. 228 Radical feminists have made a similar argument in
that they question if women can ever exercise free choice in con-
texts in which men subordinate women.229 Catharine MacKinnon
and Adrienne Rich, for example, entered the post-Roe debate to
argue that because all sex was coerced, abortion liberalization
was a means to provide cover for men's sexual exploitation of
women. 230 Thus, it would be impossible to speak of unwanted
223. U.N. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Supplement to the Handbook for Legislation on
Violence Against Women: "Harmful Practices" Against Women, 1, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/331
(2011), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatchl/daw/vaw/handbook/Supplement-to-
Handbook-English.pdf. Specifically, "[m]edical professionals have in recent years become
perpetrators of some forms of violence against women, particularly female genital mutila-
tion and pre-natal sex selection." Id. at 16.
224. Incest, Rape and Domestic Violence, supra note 186, at 2.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 86-89, 158-61 and accompanying text; see also
Vardit Ravitsky, Is Gender Selection of a Fetus Ethical?, CNN Op. (Aug. 16, 2011), http://
www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/08/15/ravitsky.gender.selectionlindex.html?iref=allsearch.
226. HVISTENDAHL, supra note 113, at 151.
227. PRENDA § 2(a)(1)(L)(ii).
228. See e.g., Hearing on India's Missing Girls, supra note 201, at 2-4 (statement of Jill
McElya, Vice President, Invisible Girl Project), available at http://docs.house.gov/meetings
/FA/FA16/20130910/101285/HHRG-113-FA16-Wstate-McElyaJ-20130910.pdf (recounting
anecdotes of women in India pressured by family members to abort because the fetus was
female or to kill a newborn female baby).
229. See Cherry, supra note 18, at 218-19 ("How much value do [women's] choices have
when made from a position of subordination and powerlessness? . . . In other words, by
valuing 'choice' in this context, do we minimize or devalue the discrimination and power-
lessness that women face under patriarchal systems?").
230. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, 184-85
(1989) ("Women feel compelled to preserve the appearance ... of male direction of sexual
expression."). MacKinnon posits that sexual intercourse cannot "simply be presumed [to]
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pregnancy without talking about unwanted sex and laws should
punish reproductive practices that re-inscribe such coercion. This
argument puts radical feminism on a collision course with the au-
tonomy claims of liberal feminists: "[W]hile abortion gives women
control over whether or when to have children, sex-selective abor-
tion gives men (husbands and families) greater influence over
women's reproduction and the sexual composition of future gen-
erations.""' In an oft-cited footnote, Catharine MacKinnon argued
sex-selective abortion should not be permitted.23 2 She wrote, "the
decision [to abort because of sex] is not a free one, even absent
governmental intervention, where a male life is valued and a fe-
male life is not."233
With arguments about individualized violence, there are pur-
ported societal harms that result from sex selection. In the same
article cited above, MacKinnon argued that "aborting female fe-
tuses may further erode women's power as women make up less
and less of the population."234 Predictions of violence erupting on a
large scale when men outnumber women-what one demogra-
pher dubbed "rampant demographic masculinization"-also per-
vade sex selection literature.3 ' A 2011 Council of Europe Resolu-
tion described the wider societal consequences in this way:
The Assembly wishes to warn Council of Europe member states
against the social consequences of prenatal sex selection, namely
population imbalances which are likely to create difficulties for men
to find spouses, lead to serious human rights violations such as
forced prostitution, trafficking for the purposes of marriage or sexual
exploitation, and contribute to a rise in criminality and social un-
236
rest.
be coequally determined." Id. at 184. Instead women often feel compelled to preserve the
appearance of male control during sexual expression. Id. at 184-85. She argues that abor-
tion allows men to ignore "the one real consequence" of having intercourse. Id at 190;
ADRIENNE RICH, OF WoMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION 269,
274 (1976) ("Abortion is violence: ... It is the offspring, and will continue to be the accuser
of a more pervasive and prevalent violence, the violence of rapism.").
231. Cherry, supra note 18, at 219.
232. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J.
1281, 1317 n.157 (1991).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. HVISTENDAHL, supra note 113, at 5.
236. EUR. PARL. Ass. 29th Sess., 6, Res. 1829 (Oct. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Eur. Res.
1829], available at assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/tall/ERES
1829.htm.
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Women's rights advocates have argued that sex selection will re-
sult in fewer daughters and, thus, fewer women to be wives or
sexual partners." The 2013 U.S. Trafficking in Persons Report
listed China's sex ratios as a cause of concern.21 8 The report stat-
ed: "The [Chinese] government did not address the effects its
birth limitation policy had in creating a gender imbalance and
fueling trafficking, particularly through bride trafficking and
forced marriage."' Hvistendahl argued that with a surplus of
men, sex trafficking, bride buying, and forced marriages will
abound: "In ... China and India, [men] visit brothels staffed by
prostitutes who have often been forced into sex work . ... [As sex
selection continues,] the supply of women will dry up."240 Howev-
er, a review of writings on son preference does not reveal defini-
tive evidence that countries with more men than women have
higher rates of trafficking or forced marriages; these claims ap-
pear predictive at best.24 1
The solutions of community education and incremental cultural
change appear to be weak solutions to what has been character-
ized as a terrible problem.24 2 The response to liberal feminist and
philosopher, Mary Anne Warren, is emblematic. Warren argued
that women's autonomy rights required recognition of a right to
abort because of fetal sex in her 1985 book, Gendercide.243 She
237. See, e.g., Remaley, supra note 18, at 279 ("The problems likely to arise from a pre-
ponderance of males go beyond the sadness experienced by the men unable to find mates
or spouses. These harms include decreased political power of females as well as the return
of the notion that women should resume their traditional family roles and should retain
their virginity for marriage. In total, the effects of a population imbalance are likely to be
extremely negative for women and affect all of society.").
238. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 129 (2013) (explaining
that the skewed sex ratio may have led to the trafficking of women to be brides and for
forced prostitution.
239. Id. at 131.
240. HVISTENDAHL, supra note 113, at 15-16.
241. Eur. Res. 1829, supra note 236; see also Therese Hesketh & Zhu Wei Xing, Ab-
normal Sex Ratios in Human Populations: Causes and Consequences, 103 PROC. NAT'L
ACAD. Sci. U.S. AM., 13271, 13273-74 (2006) ("There is much anecdotal evidence regard-
ing increases in trafficking of women, both for the sex industry and marriage, in both In-
dia and China, although it is impossible to say whether gender imbalance is a contributory
factor in this rise."); Kalantry, supra note 219, at 83 (citing Gary Becker's argument that
the market will eventually eliminate sex selection because women's value increases when
women are scarce).
242. Cf. Cherry, supra note 18, at 220-22 (noting that there is little research exploring
the efficacy or appropriateness of interventions that restrict the information pregnant
women obtain about the sex of their pregnancies).
243. See WARREN, supra note 217, at 183.
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chose the term "gendercide" because it was gender neutral.24 4 For
some of her contemporaries, "gendercide" was the "watered down"
depiction of sex selection: "Using 'gendercide' rather than 'gyne-
cide' blurs this fact in the same way that a term like 'spouse
abuse' hides the fact that it is almost always wives and other fe-
male partners (not husbands and male partners) who are beaten
in instances of so-called domestic violence."24 5
A violence approach urges that law can be the tool to eradicate
practices that harm women, including sex selection. For example,
the Beijing Platform for Action asks states to:
Enact and enforce legislation against the perpetrators of practices
and acts of violence against women, such as female genital mutila-
tion, female infanticide, prenatal sex selection and dowry-related vi-
olence, and give vigorous support to the efforts of non-governmental
and community organizations to eliminate such practices. 4
Criminal prohibitions may not seem extreme because advo-
cates characterize the prevalence of sex selection in bold terms.
Indeed, comparisons between sex selection and other social prob-
lems are stark. Scholar and demographer Christophe Guilmoto
compared the sex selection epidemic to the global spread of HIV/
AIDS: "AIDS has claimed an estimated 25 million lives world-
wide-a mere fraction of the number of missing females."2 47 More-
over, in recent testimony before the Congressional Subcommittee
on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and Internation-
al Organizations, a researcher for India's Campaign against Sex
Selection, Sabu George, stated that more girls were "eliminated"
than the "number of Jews killed in the Holocaust by the Nazis."4
244. Id. at 22.
245. Christine Overall, Critical Notice of Mary Anne Warren Gendercide: The Implica-
tions of Sex Selection, 17 CAN. J. PHIL. 683, 683-92 (1987); see also CHRISTINE OVERALL,
ETHICS AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 21-22 (1987) (critiquing Mary
Anne Warren's work on "gendercide").
246. Beijing Platform for Action, supra note 207, T 124(i).
247. Isabelle Attan6 & Christophe Z. Guilmoto, Introduction, in WATERING THE
NEIGHBOUR'S GARDEN: THE GROWING DEMOGRAPHIC FEMALE DEFICIT IN ASIA 3 (Isabelle
Attand & Christophe Z. Guilmoto eds., 2007). Hvistendahl referred to Guilmoto's compari-
son between AIDS and the number of missing females to emphasize the lack of attention
and global spending on issues related to women's rights. HVISTENDAHL, supra note 113, at
15-16.
248. Hearing on India's Missing Girls, supra note 201, at 22 (statement of Sabu
George).
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These ideas have translated to national legislation in some
countries. Of the over thirty countries with limits on sex selec-
tion, six countries have total prohibitions on all forms of sex de-
termination as well as terminations.24 9 Some bans on sex-selective
abortion or sex-determination technologies are expressions of
feminist concerns about the practice, not necessarily of anti-
abortion politics.250 In India, for example, feminist activism drove
the prohibition of any form of sex determination.25 The Bombay
Women's Center led the campaign: "For [the Center], it's the sur-
vival of women that's at stake. The social implications of sex-
selection are disastrous. It's a further degradation of the status of
women."252
On the regional level, the Council of Europe has called on
member states to "introduce legislation with a view to prohibiting
sex selection in the context of assisted reproduction technologies
249. W. Dondorp et al., ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law 20: Sex Selection for
Non-Medical Reasons, 28 HUM. REPROD. 1448, 1450 (2013) ("An overview of all 36 coun-
tries with laws or policies regarding sex selection, including 25 European countries, ....
shows that (with Israel as a qualified exception) none of these allow sex selection for non-
medical reasons.. . . ").
250. John Parkinson, House Rejects Ban on Sex-Selection Abortions, ABC NEWS (May
31, 2012), http://abcnews.go.comfblogs/politics/2012/05/house-rejects-ban-on-sex-selection-
abortions/ ("Many nations with staunchly pro-choice/pro-abortion rights laws and protec-
tions nevertheless ban sex-selection abortions. Canada, the United Kingdom, France,
Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Finland and the Netherlands all have laws ban-
ning sex-selection abortions."); see also Dondorp, supra note 249, at 1452 ("[Banning abor-
tion] may not be easy, as it might readily interfere with women's rights to ask for an abor-
tion on 'social grounds'. One option . . . is the withholding of test results that would
provide information about fetal sex, at least for so long as an abortion would still be legal-
ly possible.").
251. Steven R. Weisman, No More Guarantees of a Son's Birth, N.Y. TIMES, July 20,
1988, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/20/world/no-more-guarantees-
of-a-son-s-birth.html (noting that feminist groups and others in Bombay led effective pro-
tests outside of clinics offering sex selection in a move to promote a ban). India's Medical
Termination of Pregnancy Act provides that abortion may not be performed, except to save
the life or physical or mental health of the mother, though the Act gives districts power to
regulate abortion. In practice, it appears the law is interpreted broadly or often ignored.
Siddhivinayak S. Hirve, Abortion Law, Policy and Services in India: A Critical Review, 12
REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 114, 115-19 (2004).
252. Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Amend-
ment, Rule No. 74 of 2003, INDIA CODE (2003) ("PNDT Act"). Advocacy groups brought a
Public Interest Litigation petition, claiming that the Act was poorly enforced. The Su-
preme Court of India issued opinions in 2001 and 2003 denouncing the practice of sex-
selective abortion. The PNDT Act was renamed the Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnos-
tic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) and amended to increase penalties and fur-
ther delineate prohibited uses of ultrasounds. Ctr. For Enquiry into Health & Allied
Themes (CEHAT) v. Union of India (2003) S.C.R 3309; CEHAT v. Union of India, (2001) 3
S.C.R. 534.
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and legal abortion, except when it is justified to avoid a serious
hereditary disease."253 The Council justifies its recommendation in
the violence approach: "[T]he social and family pressure placed on
women not to pursue their pregnancy because of the sex of the
embryo/foetus is to be considered as a form of psychological vio-
lence and that the practice of forced abortions is to be criminal-
ised."254 This and similar statements suggest that all abortions
motivated by fetal sex are the product of violence. It is what
Maneesha Deckha has called "a steady and overwhelming dis-
course of tragedy and victimization,"2 55 and it is a discourse that
sits too comfortably with colonialist narratives of the "oriental-
ism" of China and India."' Conservative or religious interests rely
on similar arguments for their own purposes, forging an uneasy
alliance between radical feminist politics and neo-conservative
prohibition. In 2013, "gendercide" was the term of choice for anti-
abortion advocates, appearing in Christianity Today and the Na-
tional Catholic Register.' The proposition that sex-selective
abortion is inherently violent and coercive invites regulation."
B. The Response to Bans in the United States
Elements of the anti-discrimination and violence approaches
have travelled back to the United States in recent sex-selective
abortion bans.259 Skeptics of bills like PRENDA respond, with
good reason, that this legislation is a thinly veiled attempt to ad-
253. Eur. Res. 1829, supra note 236, 8.7.
254. Id. 5.
255. Maneesha Deckha, (Not) Reproducing the Cultural, Racial and Embodied Other:
A Feminist Response to Canada's Partial Ban on Sex Selection, 16 UCLA WoMAN's L.J. 1,
9 (2007).
256. EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM: WESTERN CONCEPTIONS OF THE ORIENT 3 (1978)
("Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over
the Orient. . . .").
257. Marian V. Liautaud, Genocide in Shades of Pink, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (Dec. 28,
2012), http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2012/december/genocide-in-shades-of-pink.ht
ml; Celeste McGovern, 'The Ugliest Form of Misogyny': Sex-Selective Abortions and the
War on Baby Girls, NAT'L CATH. REG. (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.ncregister.com/daily-ne
ws/the-ugliest-form-of-misogyny-sex-selective-abortions-and-the-war-on-baby-gil.
258. See Liautaud, supra note 257.
259. For example, last spring during a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, a North
Dakota legislator cited Hvistendahl's book, Unnatural Selection, and her argument that
160 million women are missing. Nick Smith, Abortion Bills Kick Up Debate, BISMARK
TRIB. (Mar. 12, 2013, 11:14 PM), http://bismarcktribune.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/
abortion-bills-kick-up-debate/article706928b8-8b94-1 1e2-9ae8-0019bb2963f4.html.
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vance an anti-abortion agenda. 260 After all, unlike the laws of
some other countries, PRENDA does not ban sex determination
technologies but focuses only on abortion.2 ' A review of the schol-
arly and popular literature opposed to PRENDA reveals two ar-
guments: The United States Constitution does not permit bans on
a woman's reasons for abortion, or there is insufficient proof that
sex selection actually occurs.
1. Constitutional Cures
The Center for Reproductive Rights described PRENDA as a
dangerous and unconstitutional attack on access to health ser-
vices.262 In accord with legal advocacy groups, legal scholars in-
terpreting Roe and Casey assert similar constitutional claims. For
example, Jaime King, writing about NIPT, has argued that con-
stitutional privacy rights protect the practice of sex-selective
abortion, and few legal academics have disagreed.262
260. See Mohapatra, supra note 85, at 720 ("In the United States, PRENDA and the
sex-selective state laws seem more concerned with weakening a general right to choose
rather than a sincere commitment to gender equality.").
261. See id.; see also Dov Fox, Interest Creep, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 332-33 (2014)
(calling bans on sex-selective abortion, that do not address the methods of sex determina-
tion, insincere).
262. See Susan B. Anthony and Frederick Douglass Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act of
2011: Hearing on H.R. 3541 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 198 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 PRENDA Hearing] (statement of
the Center for Reproductive Rights); CTR. fOR REPROD. RIGHTS, 2013 MID-YEAR REPORT 3
(2013), available at http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/
crr 2013 MidYearLegislativeReport.pdf (stating that bans are "nothing more than at-
tempts to diminish the rights of women to control their reproductive lives.").
263. King, Not This Child, supra note 24, at 31-34; see also Fox, Interest Creep, supra
note 261, at 328; Justin Gillette, Note, Pregnant and Prejudiced: The Constitutionality of
Sex- and Race-Selective Abortion Restrictions, 88 WASH. L. REV. 645, 649 (2013) ("Alt-
hough motive-based abortion laws may find some support in [the Gonzales] decision-
upholding a federal ban on "partial-birth abortions"-these laws differ from the Partial-
Birth Abortion Act in that they do not prohibit actions that are analogous to criminal ac-
tions, protect women's mental health, or target specific medical procedures. . . . [Clourts
reviewing motive-based abortion restrictions should find the laws unconstitutional.").
John Robertson also argued,
If a couple would not reproduce if a child had gene A but would if it had gene
B, procreative liberty should protect their decision not to reproduce in the
first case and to reproduce in the second. Denying them information about A
or B, or denying them the ability to make reproductive choices based on that
information, will interfere with their procreative liberty.
Robertson, Genetic Selection, supra note 18, at 427. But see Rao, supra note 7, at 1486 (ar-
guing there may not be a constitutional right to sex-selective abortion and "if the govern-
ment chose to enforce a policy against sex-selection not by banning certain abortions, but
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Scholars and activists argue that the Constitution protects
women's right to abortion for any reason before viability. In 1992,
a plurality of the Supreme Court in Casey preserved constitution-
al protection for abortion, but rejected Roe's trimester framework
and gave states much more discretion to restrict access to abor-
tion.26 The Court held that states may restrict abortion before vi-
ability so long as regulation does not create an "undue burden" on
a woman's choice to terminate a pregnancy.26An undue burden is
"a state regulation [that] has the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
of a nonviable fetus."266  The Casey Court also held that states
have an interest in protecting women's health and in respecting
fetal life throughout pregnancy. 2" Those questioning the constitu-
tionality of PRENDA argue that prohibiting abortion before via-
bility, based on the woman's reason for terminating the pregnan-
cy, constitutes an undue burden under Casey."'
Applying Casey's undue burden standard, the Court in Gonza-
les v. Carhart upheld a federal law that barred physicians from
using an abortion method clinically described as intact dilation
and evacuation ("intact D&E"), but referred to as "partial-birth
abortion" by abortion opponents.'The Court upheld the law even
though intact D&E could be performed before viability.270 The
Court held that the law did not impose an undue burden because,
based on congressional findings, the prohibited method of abor-
tion was not medically necessary and did not prohibit any identi-
fiable group of women from obtaining pre-viability abortions. In
rather by prohibiting prenatal testing to obtain information regarding the sex of the fetus,
such a law would likely be constitutional").
264. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844-46, 872-76 (1992)
(plurality opinion).
265. Id. at 874.
266. Id. at 877.
267. Id. at 846. The Court noted that after viability, the state could ban abortion except
when pregnancy threatened "the life or health of the mother." Id. at 879 (quoting Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973)).
268. See Robertson, Abortion and Technology, supra note 5, at 374-77.
269. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 136-37, 168 (2007) (explaining the intact D&E
procedure).
270. Id. at 147, 156-67. The Court also dismissed claims that the federal law was
vague or was overbroad. Id. at 148-50, 168.
271. The Court stated that other procedures were safe and available to women who
might otherwise have intact D&Es and that whether the procedure was necessary to pro-
tect women's health was contested by the medical profession. Id. at 158, 162-65.
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further support of the law, the Court affirmed state interests in
protecting the value of fetal life272 and the emotional health of
women, who, according to the Court, suffer from regret after in-
tact D&E.273 Justice Ginsburg, writing in dissent, argued that the
majority had "blur[red] the line, firmly drawn in Casey, between
previability and postviability abortions."7
The state interests described in Gonzales are at the center of
the sex-selection debate. Sonia Suter interprets Gonzales as ad-
dressing two interconnected questions: Does a ban constitute an
undue burden by prohibiting abortion for a group of women be-
fore viability; and if so, are state interests sufficiently important
to defend it?275 The Gonzales Court justified "blurring" the viabil-
ity line by broadening a "range of state interests that can justify
limiting reproductive decisions," such as protecting the integrity
of physicians, society as a whole, and the health and mental well-
being of women."' The issue then to consider, as Dov Fox recently
argued, is whether the state interests described in Gonzales could
be sufficiently important to justify a pre-viability, reason-based
* * 277
restriction.
Anti-abortion advocates drafted PRENDA to fit with the hold-
ing of Gonzales, and such justifications for PRENDA by anti-
abortion forces complement feminist arguments made in the in-
ternational arena. First, the Gonzales Court held that outlawing
intact D&E protects maternal health, shielding women from post-
272. See id. at 145, 160.
273. Id. at 159-60.
274. Id. at 171 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
275. See Suter, The "Repugnance" Lens, supra note 28, at 1568-69, 1576 (discussing
how Gonzales weakens the undue burden test regarding bans on abortion before viability
and strengthens the range of state interests that justify such bans).
276. Id. at 1519.
277. Fox, Interest Creep, supra note 261, at 327-28 (contending that the "key state in-
terest question for selective abortion analysis under Casey is whether, and if so by how
much, the interest in potential life is more strongly implicated when a woman seeks to
terminate her pregnancy for proscribed reasons"). A related question, but unexplored here,
is whether there is a general right to prenatal genetic information. John Robertson argues
that access to such information would be a protectable interest of pregnant women. See
Robertson, Genetic Selection, supra note 18, at 427 ("[Dlenying a person information about
the package of burdens, benefits, and rearing responsibilities that will ensue, or denying
her the ability to avoid or engage in reproduction based on that information, would affect
her decision whether to reproduce at all and would interfere with her procreative liber-
ty.").
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abortion regret.2 11 In a well-known passage, Justice Anthony
Kennedy wrote in Gonzales, "[w]hile we find no reliable data to
measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude
some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life
they once created and sustained."279 PRENDA states that women
terminating pregnancies based on fetal sex experience mental
health consequences, such as "guilt, shame and sadness."28 0
PRENDA continues that women who have sex-selective abortions
"are at increased risk for psychological and physical morbidity,
documented by their descriptions of depression, anxiety, chronic
pain, [and] physical abuse."28 1 Reproductive rights supporters con-
test evidence purporting to establish that abortion inflicts deep
regret or mental illness.28 2 But in the context of sex-selective abor-
tion, violence-based claims may support this narrative of coercion
and regret. Legal interventions, described in the previous section,
focus on the powerful cultural forces that shape women's deci-
sions and tend to treat all women who have sex-based termina-
tions as coerced.8  Indeed, a strategy that shifts all responsibility
for sex selection from women to cultural or patriarchal forces, as
the discrimination and violence approaches do, may inadvertently
invite the type of paternalism expressed in Gonzales.
Second, the Court in Gonzales explained the state's interest in
protecting the integrity of the medical profession. The Gonzales
decision describes physicians as "abortion doctor[s]."284 In Gonza-
278. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159-60; see also Suter, The "Repugnance" Lens, supra note
28, at 1577.
279. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159. But note Justice Ginsburg's dissent where she states
that while abortion may be a "painfully difficult decision," having an abortion is no more
harmful in the long run than having a child the woman "did not intend to have." Id. at 183
n.7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
280. PRENDA § 2(a)(1)(L)(iii).
281. Id. § 2(a)(1)(M).
282. See, e.g., Congress Should Not Legitimize the Mythical "Post-Abortion Syndrome",
NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM. (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/fact-she
ets/abortion-mythical-post-abortion-syndrome.pdf, Report of the APA Task Force on Men-
tal Health and Abortion, AM. PSYCH. Ass'N 92 (2008), available at http://www.apa.org
/pilwomen/programs/abortion/mental-health.pdf. But see Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics
of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL.
L. REV. 991, 1008 n.78.
283. See supra Part III.A.2; see also Jeannie Suk, The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies
and Minds of Abortion Discourse, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1193 (2010) (arguing the "le-
gal discourse of abortion trauma grows out of ideas about psychological trauma that have
become pervasively familiar in the law through the rise of feminism.").
284. Justice Ginsberg, writing in dissent, challenged the majority's language:
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les, the Court implied that abortion providers could not be trusted
to apply a health exception under the law because they stood to
gain financially from performing abortion procedures. 5 PRENDA
implies that physicians cannot be trusted or expected to manage
the use of new sex determination technology."' The typical de-
scription of ultrasound's use for sex determination is that it is too
easy and too available for providers to resist."' Applied to NIPT,
sex-selection opponents could point to the scant advice available
to physicians on the appropriate standard of care.288
Also, the Court in Gonzales suggested that intact D&E was so
distasteful that its performance cheapened the practice of medi-
cine."' PRENDA's description of sex selection as uncivilized, bar-
baric, and abhorrent captures that distaste."o Those descriptions
play on stereotypes about other cultures: "[T]he parade of (bodily)
horrors relating to non-Western women that Westerners, includ-
ing Western feminists, have historically used to demonstrate the
supposed inherent misogyny and gender backwardness of non-
Western cultures.""' International standards that describe sex se-
lection as a harmful cultural practice, listed with acid attacks and
"Throughout, the opinion refers to obstetrician-gynecologists and surgeons who perform
abortions not by the titles of their medical specialties, but by the pejorative label'abortion
doctor."' Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 186-87.
285. See id. at 159.
286. PRENDA § 250(b) (discussing civil remedies that can be obtained against a physi-
cian who knowingly aborts a child based on a determination of fetal sex). Suter, The "Re-
pugnance" Lens, supra note 28, at 1586 ("If we understand Kennedy's opinion as intended
to bolster the strength of the state interest in previable life then the opinion is much more
radical than he lets on. It begins to undo the well-established precedent that the state may
not prohibit previable abortions and opens the door to future bans of previable abortion
procedures based on visceral concerns about the sensibilities of the community and the
medical profession."); Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection, supra note 161, at 1735
(discussing how Justice Kennedy used the idea of "dignity" to put more emphasis on the
protection of potential life, thus providing more leeway to government actors when enact-
ing laws restricting abortion).
287. See Devaney et al., supra note 3, at 634.
288. See Swanson et al., supra note 43, at 113-14 (noting that only 15% of participat-
ing women's healthcare providers "reported having a 'high level of knowledge' about
NIPT').
289. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 160.
290. PRENDA § 2(a)(1)(D) (stating that sex selection abortion is barbaric); id. §
2(a)(1)(P) (stating that sex selection abortion has no place in a civilized society); 158 CONG.
REC. H3665, E945 (daily ed. June 1, 2012) (statement of Rep. McCollum) (stating that
gender selection is an abhorrent practice); Statement by Live Action on PRENDA Vote,
LIVE ACTION BLOG, http://liveaction.org/blog/statement-by-live-action-on-prenda-vote/ (last
updated May 31, 2012) (discussing sex selection abortion as an abhorrent practice).
291. Deckha, supra note 255, at 9.
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honor crimes, lend implicit support to PRENDA's language. The
characterization of "harmful cultural practices" can be part of the
often-problematic feminist claim that women, particularly women
in other countries, are "dupe[s] of patriarchy."29 2
Third, the Court upheld states' efforts to protect the integrity
of potential life. One of PRENDA's central claims is that sex se-
lection values men over women, leading to dehumanization.9
This concern connects to PRENDA's invocation of genetic engi-
neering-the slippery road to "neo-eugenic" technologies if indi-
viduals have unencumbered choice to select genetic characteris-
tics prenatally. 29 4 Fox, for example, considers three ways in which
state interests seek to protect societal values by protecting poten-
tial life: defending prenatal welfare (discrimination against cer-
tain types of fetuses),"' promoting fair social values (resisting ge-
netic manipulation),2 96 and curbing negative social effects (having
the right balance of girls and boys).2 " Fox finds bans unconstitu-
tional, but he may underestimate the persuasive pull of state in-
terests in social values and social effects.9 Concerns about genet-
ic engineering tap into broader fears that genetic technologies
will allow potential parents to design children in utero.' As disa-
bility rights advocates have long maintained, the selection of ge-
netic characteristics has profound symbolic and practical conse-
quences, a concern PRENDA repeats."oo
292. Uma Narayan, Minds of Their Own: Choices, Autonomy, Cultural Practices, and
Other Women, in A MIND OF ONE'S OWN: FEMINIST ESSAYS ON REASON AND OBJECTIVITY
418, 418-19 (Louise M. Antony & Charlotte E. Witt eds., 2002).
293. PRENDA § 2(a)(1)(K) (citing a working paper on bioethics). For the working pa-
per, see Ethical Aspects of Sex Control (The President's Council on Bioethics, Staff Work-
ing Paper 2003), available at http://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pbe/background/sex_
control.html.
294. See STERN, supra note 37, at 12 (assessing the potential for people to select supe-
rior biologically fit genetic characteristics).
295. Fox, Interest Creep, supra note 261, at 328 (stating that there is no precedent pro-
tecting fetuses under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 328, 334 ("[T]hese concerns are legitimate, but inadequate to override
rights, and that others might be categorically forbidden.").
299. See Specter, supra note 4 (explaining that because the entire genome of an embryo
can be sequenced, fetuses could soon be implanted with certain desired traits).
300. See, e.g., Adrienne Asch, Disability Equality and Prenatal Testing: Contradictory
or Compatible?, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 315, 339 (2002); Darrin P. Dixon, Informed Consent
or Institutionalized Eugenics? How the Medical Profession Encourages Abortion of Fetuses
with Down Syndrome, 24 ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 12-16 (2008); Pergament, supra note 8, at
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Moreover, Gonzales addressed the symbolic meaning of abor-
tion practices in ways similar to concerns about the societal ef-
fects of sex selection. Women's rights advocates have theorized
that women and men lend distinct perspectives and participate in
society in sex-defined ways."o' This is at the heart of the argument
that militancy, commodification, and violence will dominate if
men outnumber women. When feminists make connections made
between the rise of trafficking and sex selection, they add credi-
bility to claims of negative social effects, though seldom with the
critique of the stereotypes about women-even the seemingly be-
nign stereotypes of peacefulness-they promote.3 02 Returning to
Etzioni's writings in the 1960s, labeling women as "agents of
moral education" harkens back to assertions of women's docility
that feminists have challenged and rejected. 303
In light of Gonzales and the restrictions on abortion after Ca-
sey, it is not clear that the Supreme Court will protect abortion
rights against these state interests. 304 Reproductive rights argu-
ments depend on constitutional defenses because a reason-based
ban could spur any manner of restrictions. If the state can police
the reasons for abortion, it is no longer a woman's choice that
controls the purpose of terminating a pregnancy and the state
75-76; Teresa Santin, Is Down Syndrome Doomed? How State Statutes Can Help Ex-
pectant Parents Make Informed Decisions About Prenatal Down Syndrome Diagnoses, 6 J.
ENVTL. & PUB. HEALTH L. 239, 249-50 (2012).
301. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 53-54 (2d
ed. 2003) (describing cultural feminism as "different voice" feminism).
302. In a review of materials on the relationship between trafficking and son prefer-
ence, I did not find evidence that was more than predictive of "how bad the male surplus
will be." See HVISTENDAHL, supra note 113, at 15. The leading demographer on the issue,
Christophe Guilmoto, predicts "trouble in the marriage market," but both he and Hvisten-
dah1 offer only anecdotal accounts of trafficking and bride buying, de-emphasizing other
data that might account for both practices. Id. Hvistendahl, echoing arguments made by
Etzioni in the late 1960s, offers only: "Historically, societies in which men substantially
outnumber women are not nice places to live. Often they are unstable. Sometimes they are
violent." Id.
303. Etzioni, supra note 114, at 1109.
304. It is also important to consider the size of the group of women affected by an abor-
tion restriction. The Gonzales Court suggested that women affected by a ban on intact
D&E were too small in number to matter. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 155 (2007)
("A fetus is only delivered largely intact in a small fraction of the overall number of D&E
abortions."). Thus, the argument that sex-selective abortions rarely occur may not support
the argument that a ban on the practice would be unconstitutional. But see Planned
Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992) (rejecting the state's argument
that a spousal notification requirement was not invalid because "only one percent of the
women who obtain abortions" were affected by the requirement).
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can set the grounds for permission. It is thus understandable why
reproductive rights advocates employ constitutional arguments
as a defense; indeed, commitment to the right to choose "has been
the driving force in the mainstream liberal feminist movement in
the United States.""o' But relying on a constitutional shield is
risky; it is uncertain that the current Supreme Court would agree
with the assessment of some scholars and advocates that bans
are unconstitutional.
2. Empirical Answers
Almost every opponent of bans on sex-selective abortion in the
United States also asserts that sex selection practices are rare or
non-existent and are thus not of concern. For example, the
Guttmacher Institute, a pro-choice research group, reported in
2012 that sex selection is extremely uncommon and even if sex
selection infrequently occurred, parents are as likely to prefer
girls to boys."'o The National Asian Pacific American Women's Fo-
rum ("NAPAWF"), in testimony opposing PRENDA before the
House of Representatives, argued that there is little evidence sex-
selective abortions are so widespread as to cause concern in the
United States.0 ' Even if sex-selective abortion occurs, NAPAWF
argued, too small a percentage of the population (less than 2%)
engages in the practice of son preference for it to make a differ-
308
ence.
The World Health Organization and others have called for
more research on the prevalence of sex selection and on the fac-
tors that influence parents' decisions.0 ' But better data neither
305. See Kalantry, supra note 219, at 75-76. Kalantry cites Tabitha Powledge, who
states: "To make it illegal to use prenatal diagnostic techniques for sex choice is to nibble
away at our hard-won reproductive control, control that . .. is the absolute rock-bottom
minimum goal we have got to keep achieved." Tabitha M. Powledge, Unnatural Selection:
On Choosing Children's Sex, in THE CUSTOM-MADE CHILD?: WOMEN-CENTERED
PERSPECTIVES 193, 197 (Helen B. Holmes et al. eds., 1981)).
306. See Barot, supra note 90, at 21; see also supra note 179. See generally
HVISTENDAHL, supra note 113, at 251-52, 256-57.
307. 2011 PRENDA Hearing, supra note 262, at 68.
308. Id.
309. See WHO INTERAGENCY STATEMENT, supra note 189, at 8. Fox, Interest Creep, su-
pra note 261, at 329-30 (stating that there is insufficient proof of sex selection in the
United States, and arguing "[t]o establish whether selective abortion threatens objection-
able demographic disparities, a court would need to consider, namely, both empirical evi-
dence linking birthrate statistics to selective abortion and normative reasons about why it
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meets concerns about the symbolic harm of selecting fetal sex nor
satisfies the desire to punish or eliminate violence against wom-
en, even if the practice occurs infrequently or happens only in
discrete communities. Ross Douthat, a conservative columnist for
the New York Times, argued:
Try to imagine a similar sentence being written about a different
practice or problem. "The problem with criminalizing female genital
mutilation is that it's not entirely clear there is a problem. The prac-
tice is a huge tragedy in parts of Africa, but to the extent it's hap-
pening in this country, it's mostly among African immigrants." Or:
"The problem with criminalizing human trafficking is that it's not
entirely clear there is a problem. The practice is a huge tragedy in
parts of the developing world, but to the extent it's happening in this
country, it's mostly among Third World immigrants.
There are many reasons to criticize analogies of sex-selective
abortion to female genital cutting or trafficking. For instance,
terminating a pregnancy in the United States receives constitu-
tional protection, and an abortion ban raises the types of ques-
tions posed by the previous section. Douthat's point, though con-
tentious, is that claiming a practice is rare or infrequent does not
dampen the moral opposition to that practice.
In response, and related to empirical claims, abortion rights
advocates typically argue that not only do sex-selective abortion
bans fail to work,"' but they also threaten the reproductive rights
of women.12 Though the preferred solutions are policies that re-
would be bad to allow any resulting decline").
310. Ross Douthat, Op-Ed, When Is Sex-Selective Abortion a 'Problem'?, N.Y. TIMES
(May 31, 2012), http://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/when-is-sex-selective-aborti
on-a-problem/.
311. See, e.g., CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, supra note 262, at 3 (arguing that a ban on
sex selection does not work and instead bans threaten "health and human rights of wom-
en"). South Korea is often cited as an "exception" to unenforceability of bans, reducing im-
balanced sex ratios by a ban on sex determination and a "Love Your Daughters" media
campaign. However, Woojin Chung and Monica Das Gupta argue that sex ratios changed
because the economy improved, thus undercutting the basis for son preference, not neces-
sarily because of publicity or legal reform. Woojin Chung & Monica Das Gupta, The De-
cline of Son Preference in South Korea: The Roles of Development and Public Policy, 33
POPULATION & DEV. REV. 757, 777-78 (2007); Vogel, supra note 172, at 288.
312. See, e.g., CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, supra note 262, at 3. However, some human
rights and women's rights advocates in India, for example, embraced the legal tool of pro-
hibition. See ANNE GALLAGHER, U.N. POPULATION FUND & ASIA PAC. FORUM OF NAT'L
HUM. RIGHTS INSTS., INTEGRATING REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS INTO THE WORK OF NATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION: A PRELIMINARY STUDY OF
CURRENT VIEWS AND PRACTICES, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 26 (2011), available at
http://www.asiapacificforum.net/files/NHRIsand _Reproductive-Rights.pdf.
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vise existing laws to expand rights and to change attitudes about
sex and gender, it is not clear those solutions make sense in the
United States.
In terms of reforming law on the books, the United States does
not face a crisis in legal sex inequality. Many discriminatory fed-
eral and state laws have been held unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.313 There is
formal equality by law between men and women, in inheritance,
education, work, pay, and other fields.3 14 This is not to suggest
that the U.S. legal system (or cultural life) is free from gender in-
equalities. However, the challenge in the United States is not the
revision of positive law so that it is sex neutral, but challenging
the discriminatory effects of law."'
Reproductive rights advocates also highlight discriminatory at-
titudes, not just law, as a cause of sex selection. This position typ-
ically supports calls for public education campaigns. In a hearing
on son preference before a House Committee, Mallika Dutt, Pres-
ident of Breakthrough, a human rights advocacy organization,
testified:
[T]he only way to achieve long-lasting social change on issues of
gender bias, especially sex selective practices, is through working to
fundamentally shift attitudes and culture at the community level
and to comprehensively address the underlying issues that propa-
gate inequity.3 1 6
313. See Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrim-
ination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 124, 135--38 (2010) (reviewing different cases that ad-
dressed the constitutionality of discriminatory laws based on sex); cf. REPLACING MYTHS
WITH FACTS, supra note 91, at 25 (noting that laws, such as laws governing inheritance
and other potentially discriminatory policies that incentivize sex selection in countries like
India do not exist in the United States).
314. See Robertson, Genetic Selection, supra note 18, at 457-58 ("In the United States
and Europe, where there are few population restrictions, weaker cultural attitudes or
preferences for males, and legal protection for women's rights, the feared harm to women
appears unlikely [and in fact] . . . it is likely that gender ratio imbalances are ultimately
self-correcting. As the shortage of females bids up their value and leads to greater demand
for them, their numbers will increase.").
315. See, e.g., Constitutional and Legal Provisions for Women in India, NAT'L LEGAL
RES. DESK, http://nlrd.org/womens-rights-initiativellegislations-laws-related-to-women/
constitutional-and-legal-provisions-for-women-in-india (last visited Nov. 24, 2014) ("The
Constitution of India not only grants equality to women but also empowers the State to
adopt measures of positive discrimination in favour of women for neutralizing the cumula-
tive socioeconomic, education and political disadvantages faced by them.").
316. Hearing on India's Missing Girls, supra note 201, at 39 (statement of Mallika
Dutt, President, Breakthrough).
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A 2011 United Nations report similarly argued that "empower-
ing education" and policies that promote "attitudes . .. supportive
of greater equality" were successful in reducing son preference."'
However, there is seldom discussion of how these anti-
discrimination strategies work, what concrete proposals to ad-
vance them would entail, and how to measure success. This is not
to discount the importance of community or public education
campaigns; it is only to suggest that arguments about "what
works" make the same assumptions as arguments about the need
for criminal bans. Indeed, this last point has been a source of
feminist disagreement:
While some forms of social deterrence and consciousness-raising may
be important components of a feminist and modified pragmatic ap-
proach to the problem of the selective abortion of female fetuses,
there has been little feminist exploration regarding why and wheth-
er legal control of the knowledge of fetal sex is appropriate . . . . a
[r]estriction would act as a social criticism of a system where the in-
stitutionalization of misogyny is so great that we must act in such a
318
radical manner.
Advocates for reproductive rights are in a bind. They want to
argue bans are unconstitutional or that sex selection does not oc-
cur, but they also do not want to diminish the public condemna-
tion of son preference abroad or at home.31" As a consequence of
this dilemma, there is little room for solutions that are not about
legislating against abortion or protecting established abortion
rights. The final part of this article considers ways in which re-
productive rights advocates can move past the current impasse of
sex-selective abortion defined as discrimination or violence.
IV. RESPONSES TO NEW REGULATION
The current debate that NIPT has helped inspire is at a stand-
still. Neither proponents nor opponents of sex selection bans can
claim victory. Constitutional arguments attempt to neutralize the
debate by relying on courts to shield the public from irresponsible
laws or irresponsible practices. For reasons set out in Part III,
both PRENDA opponents and supporters could be disappointed
317. WHO INTERAGENCY STATEMENT, supra note 189, at 7.
318. Cherry, supra note 18, at 221-22.
319. Id. at 222-23.
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with courts' answers.32 Courts could further blur the viability
line, as the Supreme Court did in Gonzales. Additionally, courts
might enjoin sex selection bans, a possibility anticipated in claus-
es applying a bill after viability, if a court finds the law unconsti-
tutional."'
Empirical arguments also cut both ways. For reproductive
rights advocates, it is impossible to prove that sex selection never
happens, and if it does, it would be difficult to prove that the act
is never directed at avoiding the birth of a girl. For the anti-
abortion movement, laws like PRENDA will continue to be diffi-
cult to enforce. A pregnant woman could have NIPT in one facili-
ty and seek an abortion in another; patients can withhold and
misrepresent their reasons for testing or for abortion. Without a
more intrusive state mechanism for assessing truthfulness, it is
easier to skirt around reason-based bans.
Both "sides" view law as the problem and answer-there is ei-
ther too much or too little of it, and the Constitution's application
or new legislative enactments must protect or eliminate existing
rights. Those opposing abortion will continue to pursue legislative
bans, likely with continued success and with problematic legisla-
tive line drawing. Constitutional and empirical retorts have not
stemmed legislative enthusiasm for abortion bans based on any
genetic or physical abnormality, as seen recently in the passage
of the North Dakota law.323 Moreover, leaving to state legislatures
the task of deciding what genetic conditions are serious and what
conditions are not is a disconcerting prospect for not only repro-
ductive rights advocates, but also for the disability rights com-
munity.3 24
320. See supra notes 282-86 and accompanying text.
321. See, e.g., PRENDA § 4 (copying verbatim Section C of the AUL Model Legislation,
which preserves bans applied after viability if the law is found unconstitutional (if applied
before viability)).
322. See Kohm, supra note 18, at 120. As noted, states are increasingly legislating to
capture and vet reasons for abortions (requiring patients to sign affidavits, for example),
and those supportive of abortion rights may not want to invite anti-abortion legislators to
attempt to solve problems of enforceability. See supra text accompanying note 174.
323. H.B. 1305, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013).
324. For example, North Dakota lists what it considers "abnormalities" under the stat-
ute: "any physical disfigurement, scoliosis, dwarfism, Down syndrome, albinism, amelia,
or any other type of physical or mental disability, abnormality, or disease." Id. § 14.-02. 1-
02(6). This is the kind of legislative line drawing-what is "abnormal" and what is not-
that the disability rights community has resisted. See, e.g., Asch, supra note 300, at 339;
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And both proponents and opponents of sex-selective abortion
bans are defined and limited by their political commitments.
Abortion rights advocates might agree that sex-selective abortion
is a problematic practice, but their justifiable commitment to
keeping reason-based bans off the books make those concerns dif-
ficult to confront. Reproductive rights advocates are thus hesitant
to acknowledge that some terminations involve coercion; abortion
opponents reject that many abortions greatly improve women's
lives or that the "cost" to fetal life may be "worth it." The priority
for abortion opponents has been fetal personhood; women who
choose abortion undermine the moral value that the pro-life
community places on fetuses.325
At this impasse, health care providers manage the testing for
fetal sex. Decisions after prenatal testing, as noted in Part II, are
largely unregulated and almost entirely shaped by professional
medical ethics. Because of the lack of enforcement, bills like
PRENDA do not actually disrupt the status quo in which obste-
tricians and genetic counselors oversee testing and abortion deci-
sions. This may also be an uncomfortable place for both oppo-
nents and proponents of sex-selective abortion bans. Those
supporting abortion worry about physician paternalism; indeed,
the dicta of Casey cemented a shift in thinking about abortion as
a physician's decision, as set out in Roe, to abortion as a woman's
right."' Anti-abortion advocates suspect that physicians are eco-
nomically and politically beholden to an "abortion industry."327
What will happen in the offices of physicians and genetic coun-
selors is an open question.' What is known is that abortion is an
Mary Crossley & Lois Shepherd, Genes and Disability: Questions at the Crossroads, 30
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. xi, xi-xii (2003); Martha A. Field, Killing "The Handicapped"-Before
and After Birth, 16 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 79, 110 (1993).
325. See, e.g., DENISE M. BURKE & MARY T. NOVICK, Primer on Legal Personhood: Legal
Recognition of Unborn & Newly Born, AMs. UNITED FOR LIFE, DEFENDING LIFE 2013
(2013), available at http://www.aul.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/04_Recognition-of-Un
born-Section.pdf .
326. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-53 (1992).
327. See William Saletan, The Abortion Industry: The Hidden Factions of the Abortion
Trade: Feminists, Doctors, and Entrepreneurs, SLATE (Feb. 17, 2011, 12:41 PM), http://ww
w.slate.com/articles/newsand-politics/the back alley/2011/02/the abortionindustry.html
(describing an "abortion industry" as "a postulated alliance of clinic operators and their
apologists, chiefly Planned Parenthood[,... in which] clinic owners and abortion rights
activists often banded together").
328. For a full discussion of challenges and changes in genetic counseling after the
wider introduction of NIPT, see Rachel Rebouch6, Non-Invasive Testing, Non-Invasive
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essential, though complicated, choice after prenatal testing."9
Some women feel pressure to abort for certain disorders, experi-
encing guilt and sadness, and some women experience relief after
the procedure. Those experiences cannot be easily categorized in
boxes marked "pro-choice" or "pro-life."330
But abortion politics promise to monopolize debates about reg-
ulating genetic testing for sex or for any other fetal characteris-
tic."' NIPT will invite more regulation of the information and
counseling that patients receive in the form of laws that do not
ban abortion entirely but attempt to restrict and manage preg-
nant women's decisions.332 Recent Virginia and Nebraska statutes
permit genetic counselors to refuse to explain test results or op-
tions after testing if, in the words of the Virginia law, the coun-
seling "conflicts with [the counselor's] deeply-held moral or reli-
gious beliefs.""' A question for reproductive rights advocates is
not only how to react to anti-abortion measures, but what are the
regulatory choices abortion supporters should make.
In regard to sex selection, this article does not offer a regulato-
ry answer. Rather, it asks reproductive rights advocates to con-
sider their options and to contemplate the consequences of their
choices. Until this point, abortion supporters have offered consti-
tutional or empirical defenses, but they have not offered a way
Counseling, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS (forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter Rebouch6, Non-
Invasive Testing]; see also STERN, supra note 37, at 147 (describing the evolution of genetic
counseling as more patients sought prenatal diagnosis).
329. STERN, supra note 37, at 9 (describing the responsibilities of genetic counselors to
explain the option of terminating pregnancy after testing).
330. See generally R. Alta Charo & Karen H. Rothenberg, "The Good Mother": The Lim-
its of Reproductive Accountability and Genetic Choice, in WOMEN AND PRENATAL TESTING:
FACING THE CHALLENGES OF GENETIC TECHNOLOGY 105, 106-07 (Karen H. Rothenberg &
Elizabeth J. Thompson eds., 1994); Barbara K. Rothman, The Tentative Pregnancy: Then
and Now, in WOMEN AND PRENATAL TESTING: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF GENETIC
TECHNOLOGY 260, 260-62, 267-70 (Karen H. Rothenberg & Elizabeth J. Thompson eds.,
1994); Karen H. Rothenberg, The Law's Response to Reproductive Genetic Testing: Ques-
tioning Assumptions About Choice, Causation, and Control, 8 FETAL DIAGNOSIS &
THERAPY 160, 162 (1993).
331. Rebouch6, Non-Invasive Testing, supra note 328, at 13.
332. An increasing number of disorders can be treated in utero, making testing infor-
mation all the more important to potential parents. Moreover, test results aid in planning
post-natal care for certain conditions. The question of decision-making after test results is
not solely one that concerns termination decisions. See Benn & Chapman, Ethical Chal-
lenges in Providing Non-Invasive Prenatal Diagnosis, supra note 43, at 131.
333. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2957.21 (Supp. 2014); see also NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-3424
(Cum. Supp. 2012) (refusal rights for genetic counselors).
2015] 575
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
out of the sex-selection dilemma. NIPT's wider introduction sug-
gests that abortion opponents need to find common strategies
with the medical professionals that shape prenatal testing prac-
tices.
As noted, professional societies such as ACOG and ASRM hesi-
tate to ban sex determination because of concerns about patient
autonomy, believing that a patient should have the right to learn
information about her pregnancy. At the same time, however,
professional organizations are skeptical about the use of NIPT for
fetal characteristics like sex. Reproductive rights advocates ex-
press a similar position: they too are committed to women's rights
to autonomy, but worry about the ethics of prenatal sex determi-
nation. Perhaps abortion supporters should stop contesting sex
selection bans, which is distinct from accepting or supporting
bans, and direct some of their energies to the daily management
of testing and options counseling. As reproductive rights advo-
cates have argued, sex-selective abortion bans are difficult to en-
force. However, even with obstacles to enforcement, advocates
need to come to terms with the negative impact of bans on some
pregnant women-e.g., patients that are uninformed, new to the
country, or otherwise vulnerable.
As a way forward, reproductive rights advocates could support
policies that influence the delivery of NIPT and minimize the
costs of bans-scripts for abortion providers, training manuals, or
tailored informed consent standards, for example. This requires
embracing, rather than rejecting, how sex determination works
and why sex-selective abortions occur. It also suggests recogniz-
ing how sex selection currently operates outside of the law and
how the practice will likely change in the future. With the intro-
duction of NIPT, for example, sex determination could turn into
an entirely at-home exercise with home testing kits.
The purpose of this article is to suggest that reproductive
rights advocates have policy choices; they are not wholly margin-
alized in their support of abortion and they have legal tools at
their disposal other than resisting prohibition. Although this ar-
ticle does not take a position as to what reproductive rights advo-
cates should do, it urges PRENDA's opponents to abandon un-
convincing responses to sex-selective abortion and to accept some
regulatory power. More importantly, advocates should decide
what compromises are worthwhile. Because the reasons to govern
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are policy arguments not rights claims, they are not empirical
truths but grounded in the practical realities of new tests and
new markets for those tests.
CONCLUSION
This article has argued that sex-selective abortion debates
have shifted understandably to respond to an important new
technology for prenatal testing, but that this noisy and frequently
frustrating debate has stolen attention from the complex repro-
ductive health issues that NIPT and its regulation create. This is
a pressing problem for policy makers because this country's un-
derstanding of sex selection has developed within the long history
of activism around discrimination and violence against women.
Constitutional and empirical arguments have not given propo-
nents or opponents of reform a way out-they have only sidelined
and sidetracked debates about how law, medical ethics, and pre-
natal diagnosis should intersect. A reproductive justice perspec-
tive could add much more to debates on genetic counseling, in-
formed consent, and physician oversight. At present, however,
that voice is almost entirely lent to a legislative conversation it
cannot seem to sway.
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